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Continuous crisis in the European Union has resulted in skewed power dynamics 
between Member States and supra-state institutions. This project explores how German leaders 
have positioned themselves in the European Union during acute crises and how their discourse 
promotes integration efforts. Press conferences, press statements, and government statements 
between 2010–2020 are analyzed, informed by actor-produced policy-narrative analysis and 
archival research methods. Dominant themes of economic stability, unity, and bordering are 
revealed. European institutional power and European identity have shifted in the last decade due 
to the complex institutional dynamics between nation states and the European Union. Broader 
questions over identity, border control, and the future of Europe have been challenged by theses 
crises as policies pushed forward by Germany have both increased and decreased integration. 
Recent trends in anti-Europeanism among the German electorate have shifted domestic politics 
away from pro-integrationist policies, threatening the support for future European 














Introduction: Always Somewhere Between the US and EU 
 
I have been moving between the United States and Germany since I was an infant. Part of 
my extended family lives in Germany so I have spent summer and winter breaks moving 
between the European Union and the United States for the majority of my life. My dual 
citizenship has made this movement exponentially easier. This ease of movement was made 
obvious to me when my family moved to Berlin briefly and only my mother — who is an 
American — needed to acquire residency, while my siblings and I did not. Coming to college, 
mobility and migration have been at the forefront of my academic interests. And while 
discussing the bordering and restriction of movement of others, the privilege and ease of my own 
mobility has been brought to the forefront of my more recent travel experiences.  
Studying abroad was something I had dreamt about my entire college career and getting 
on a plane, getting out of Burlington, and going to one of the most eclectic and historic places in 
Germany was a pinnacle in personal and academic achievement. Going to Berlin for seven 
months on my own, living in a Wohngemeinschaft with German students, and getting an 
internship over the summer felt liberating and like I was finally becoming “German.” I was 
always the “American” among my German friends and although I could flash my German ID, 
my shoes, wallet, and misuse of the dative always gave me away. Although Germany was a very 
familiar place to me, I was ready to truly connect with a large part of my identity. Not only did I 
have my own personal goals with language acquisition and personal growth, but I also was 
striving toward an academic goal that had been built and fostered through global studies projects 
at UVM. I was to build a country profile on refugee resettlement using local sources, my own 
photography, and a daily journal. Once in Berlin I began asking my professors about local 
organizations to get in touch with and resources I could use for my project. As I was exploring 
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the city and taking pictures of neighborhoods, fliers, and food stands while going to classes about 
the history of the European Union and the culture of Berlin, the city itself started to get quieter. 
We had an emergency meeting. We were being sent home because of the exponential increase of 
coronavirus cases.  
Five weeks. Five weeks of constantly speaking and thinking in German. Five weeks of 
trying to spatialize and visualize refugee resettlement in a city that seems to be full of different 
types of migrants from resettled refugees to Erasmus students to European expatriates. When I 
came back to my parents’ house in Maryland I was defeated and felt like I had been ripped away 
from growth, from engaging with the world, from understanding how to conduct research “on the 
ground.” And yet, amid my sadness I began to reflect on systems of mobility — which I am so 
often drawn to in my academic pursuits — and how unprecedented the COVID-19 pandemic 
was. I was overwhelmed but enthralled by the current state of immobility.  
The refugee resettlement project I was pursuing abroad was reframed once the pandemic 
hit, and I was able to complete country profiles on refugee resettlement in Austria and Germany. 
This research was foundational for my thesis as it informed me on the history of German 
migration law and policy as well as on leadership’s position throughout the migrant crisis. Doing 
extensive research on the tensions between Austria and Germany during the migrant crisis 
provided deeper questions on Euroregions – border regions between Member States – and how 
identity politics play out in technically border free areas. This then prompted further inquisition 
into how Germany dictates policy initiatives, not only nationally but also at the EU level. This 
sparked my interest in how Germany acts as a national and European leader during times of 
crisis.  
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My own experience of mobility restriction in the German context made me question the 
concept of a European identity and the reality of European mobility during crisis. While I was 
debating whether or not to stay in Berlin in March 2020, I was considering two things: I had a lot 
more trust in the German healthcare system and government to handle a crisis situation than I did 
the United States and the fact that most people could not choose between staying and leaving. I 
knew I would be able to go back to the United States regardless of Donald Trump’s border 
closures because I was a US citizen and had a right to repatriation. I also knew I had the right to 
stay in Germany unlike most of my peers who had not acquired their German student visas yet. 
 Understanding my privilege of mobility and education, I have used my personal and 
familial connections as well as past academic pursuits in the realm of migrations studies to drive 
this project on Germany’s positionality in European cohesion during crisis. My own positionality 
has largely informed my thesis work, as mobility and borders have always been central to how I 
get to see my family — who are currently living in San Diego, New York City, London, and 
Mönchengladbach — yet have only recently been restricted to me.  
 The European Union’s foundations are built on the principles of the free movement of 
people, goods, services, and capital. However, from its inception the EU has been challenged by 
a dichotomy between integration and nationalism. For over a decade, a culmination of crises 
have challenged the project of a unified Europe. The Eurozone crisis beginning in 2009, the 
“migrant” crisis beginning in 2015, and the COVID-19 crisis beginning in 2020 have all 
impacted the Single Market, the free movement of people and goods, and the idea of European 
identity. There have been other acute crises during this time frame, notably Brexit, the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. While this decision, first voted on by the 
citizens of the UK in 2016 and officially implemented in 2021, addresses these key questions 
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surrounding financial stability, free movement, and European identity over nationalism,  I chose 
not to include it in my analysis. Starting with the COVID-19 pandemic and the global processes 
it disrupted (economic flows, migratory flows, healthcare capacities) I moved backwards and 
looked at crises that impacted European policies in these acute areas. The Eurozone crisis and 
migrant crisis address institutional policies of financial stability and free movement. I believed 
introducing Brexit as a case study along with COVID-19 would be examples that are 
intersectional in ways that were too complicated to achieve in this project. For clarity and 
concision, I address Brexit and the UK’s role in European politics and focus on the Eurozone 
crisis, the migrant crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis to address my research questions.  
Moving through continuous crisis, the tension between European institutions and nation 
states has grown. Germany has increasingly emerged as a leading voice within the EU during 
crises. The discourse used by German officials since reunification stresses the dependency 
Germany has had on the European community. As Germany has become a more politically and 
economically dominant Member State, the political discourse has begun to balance domestic 
interests with European ones. German leaders use discourse that provides examples of how 
European institutional power and European identity have shifted as a result of crisis 
management. Within this shift, citizens have become key to pushing for broader integrative 
measures through their willingness to cooperate with crisis mitigation strategies.  
The main research questions this project seeks to answer are: how do crises complicate 
the idea of the European Union? How has Germany framed itself within each crisis and how has 
its policies influenced the idea of a unified Europe? How does identity, mobility, and economic 
power get leveraged during times of crisis to promote or oppose integration?  
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 This study complements existing literature by providing an analysis of how German 
leadership’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the Eurozone crisis and 
migrant crisis has impacted European integration. The questions of European identity and 
European unity are intertwined with these crises and what they have threatened: financial 
stability, mobility, and health and wellbeing. The mass politicization of national identity that has 
arisen as a result of the Eurozone and migrant crisis has impeded progress in burden sharing and 
crisis mitigation strategies across. Further study in this field may reveal the ongoing impact the 
coronavirus pandemic is having on European integration as well as the complex dynamics that 
operate between the nation state and supra-state institutions. 
The paper is divided into seven sections. It begins with an introduction which explains 
my relationship to this research and gives a description of the dynamic relationships between 
nation states and supra-state actors and the tensions that arise from power imbalances. After, I 
provide a detailed account of my methodologies which lays out how I acquired and analyzed my 
data as well as why I chose a historical-textual analysis. I analyze 27 documents which include 
press statements, press conferences, and government statements from the Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Government of Germany. These documents provide a mixture of question 
and answer forums with Chancellor Angela Merkel and other political leaders, as well as 
straightforward explanations of government policy positions. Each is split into three time frames 
marking the beginning, middle, and (perceived) end of the crisis. Within each time frame I select 
three texts by searching for keywords such as “Eurozone,” “asylant,” (asylum seeker) and 
“coronavirus” to narrow my search. After selecting my samples, I coded my data in NVivo using 
open and axial coding. This multi-step coding process allowed me to look for broad themes as 
well as cross-crisis themes. I ensured I was “informed by prior in-depth reading on current 
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scholarship around the topic but accompanied by an openness around the ultimate direction of 
the research” (Roche 2010, 228). By mixing techniques used in archival research with discourse 
analysis, I was informing myself on nuanced references made by politicians as well as 
contextualizing events that happened during the time the press conference, press statement, or 
government statement was released.  
The next section provides an overview of the existing literature on crisis theory and 
European integration theory, as well as an extensive review of the Eurozone crisis and migrant 
crisis and how it impacted Germany and the EU. There is less literature covering the COVID-19 
crisis, but I include an overview of how Germany and the EU addressed the crisis beginning in 
January 2020. I additionally provide an overview of right-wing populism across Europe and how 
it connects to these crises and impacts European integration. Next, I contextualize Germany in 
the EU by providing an overview of the European project and Germany’s history and standing 
within the bloc.  
I then set out my findings. I divide this section into themes: contextualizing crisis, 
German leadership, economic power and privilege, unity and cooperation, and bordering and 
rebordering. Using quotes from the press conferences, press statements, and government 
statements, the complicated relationships between the nation state and European institutions is 
revealed. My next section analyzes my findings, discussing the disconnect between national and 
supranational agreements, which I argue has resulted in varying degrees of disintegration and 
integration efforts during crisis in Europe. I inform my analysis through the hegemonic-stability 
theory, which challenges main European integration theories by claiming that the dominance of 
Germany is necessary (although not sufficient) for the maintenance of a stable European Union. 
Germany’s role as a hegemon in Europe has been debated among scholars, yet since the 
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Eurozone crisis especially, it has been described by many as the EU’s “indispensable nation” 
(Webber 2014, 1145). With Germany’s position as a stabilizing hegemon in the European Union, 
the centrality of the supranational institution in German leaders’ discourse during both the 
Eurozone crisis and the migrant crisis was profound. The COVID-19 crisis rescaled the gravity 
of threat facing Germany, but also repositioned broader transnational cooperation and solidarity. 
Rescaling border control towards the nation state but cooperation on crisis support towards the 
supranational level has impacted Germany’s role as the stable hegemon and will have lasting 
impacts on the EU.  
Finally, I conclude with an update on coronavirus policies within Germany and the EU 
since my data collection ended. Both have struggled in wakes of second- and third outbreaks 
combined with slow vaccination rollouts. I call for further study on how the COVID-19 
pandemic has impacted Germany’s role as a hegemonic influence in the European region. A 
popular perspective through a media analysis could complement this study and provide 


















Methodology: Policy Narratives Informed by Archival Research 
 
In order to explore how German leadership has impacted European integration during 
crises, I decided to use qualitative discourse analysis informed by both actor-produced policy-
narrative analysis and archival research methods. I selected samples of press conferences, press 
statements, and government policy statements selected from the onset of each crisis, the middle 
of each crisis, and the perceived end of each crisis. Because the COVID-19 crisis is on-going, I 
chose time periods that coincided with the beginning of European lockdowns in March, the 
summer (from June - August) when there was stability in case numbers, and October when there 
was threat of a second wave. A summary of what has happened since October — including the 
onset of a second and third wave and the European vaccination program — will be included in 
my conclusion. The press statements, press conferences, and government policy statements were 
acquired from the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany. The 
government provides transcripts of all governmental press statements, press conferences, 
government policy statements, speeches, press releases, and interviews in German. Only a few 
texts are available in other languages. There were only three translated documents in English that 
were relevant to the crises and within my time frames, and after reaching out to the Press and 
Information Office in order to obtain copies of English transcripts of the specific documents I 
was working with, I decided to use the original German texts.  
I decided to analyze press statements, press conferences, and government policy 
statements because they provided a mixture of question and answer forums with Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and other political leaders as well as straightforward explanations of the 
government policy positions. The voicing of public opinion and concern in the manner of 
questions from reporters as well as the more concise statements made by the government gave 
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differing insights into German crisis management. Additionally, previous work done to 
understand European’s crisis management protocols has employed actor-produced policy-
narrative analysis (Fischer 2003 and Fischer and Forester 1993). Maricut 2017 suggests that the 
objectives of the researcher are most important in an actor-produced policy-narrative approach, 
and that the narratives must be appropriately and consistently used as a means to reach those 
ends. Policy narratives, provided by government texts like press states, press conferences, and 
government statements, are “organized forms of discourse put forward by actors involved in the 
policy process who ‘share a social construct’ and ‘actively try to impose their views of reality on 
others” (Maricut 2017, 163). Political actors speak with a functional purpose, as they are trying 
to construct narratives to confront a social phenomenon. I used this actor-produced policy-
narrative analysis to inform my own data analysis. Because the data collected are government 
sources from 2010-2020 and could not elaborate on a topic or answer follow-up questions, I 
ensured I was “informed by prior in-depth reading on current scholarship around the topic but 
accompanied by an openness around the ultimate direction of the research” (Roche 2010, 228). 
Roche emphasizes the need for rigorous preparedness for archival research. While doing initial 
coding, I made sure to note policies that I had not yet contextualized in my literature review. 
This process ensured I was informing myself of the context of the press conferences, press 
statements, and government states so I could understand nuanced speech and slang. Combining a 
policy-narrative analysis approach with methods used during archival research, I ensured I was 
informing myself on references made by politicians as well as contextualizing events that 
happened during the time each press conference, press statement, or government statement was 
released.  
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To find documents, I relied on the Press and Information Office website’s archive. It 
allows you to search specific types of documents by year and by key words. You can search 
“before 2010” or by each year from 2010–2021. Each crisis is split into three time frames that 
mark the beginning, middle, and (perceived) end of the crisis. Within each time frame I selected 
three texts by searching for keywords such as “eurozone,” “asylant,” (asylum seeker) and 
“coronavirus” to narrow my search. I also had used timeframes of larger events happening in 
Europe and Germany to further narrow these searches, such as when Germany provided bailout 
loans to Greece or asylum seekers arrived at the Munich train station. While these events are 
subjectively deemed important, it was helpful in contextualizing political actors motivations.   
For the Eurozone crisis I chose documents from April 28, 2010, June 14, 2010, October 
27, 2010, February 22, 2011, July 22, 2011, October 23, 2011, May 16, 2013, October 25, 2013, 
and December 20, 2013. In 2010, a series of austerity measures, emergency loans, and bailout 
packages were implemented. Specifically, the Eurozone countries agreed to 30 billion in 
emergency loans in April 2010; in May Eurozone Member States along with the International 
Monetary Fund agreed to a 110 billion bailout package for Greece, and another bailout package 
for Ireland at the end of November. In February 2011 the European Stability Mechanism, a 
permanent bailout fund, was established. In the summer of 2011, there were talks of Greece 
being the first country to have to leave the eurozone, accompanied by EU loans and 
implementation of austerity measures. In October 2011 another round of Greek bailout loans was 
approved. In 2013, the Eurozone crisis was perceived to be largely over; however, in May the 
European Central Bank cut the bank rate to 0.5 percent to aid recovery and again in November to 
0.25 percent.  
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For the migrant crisis I pulled documents from June 18, 2015, September 24, 2015, 
November 29, 2015, January 22, 2016, March 16, 2016, May 27, 2016, February 3, 2017, 
August 11, 2017 and August 29, 2017. In June 2015 the European Council agreed to relocate 
40,000 migrants from Italy and Greece to other Member States. In September 2015 Angela 
Merkel famously declared “Wir schaffen das” as thousands of refugees, who had been held at the 
Keleti train station in Budapest, were allowed to travel to Austria and Germany. In November 
2015 there were a series of terrorist attacks which shifted many European officials’ stance on 
border control and migration policy. In January 2016 there were sexual assaults in Cologne, 
Germany, with suspects who were asylum seekers, causing public backlash against Germany’s 
liberal migration policy. In March 2016, the EU-Turkey agreement was established. In May 
2016, EU discussions of burden sharing of migrants increased. In 2017, the height of the 
European migrant crisis seemed to be over, but across Europe anti-immigration parties began to 
enter governments as a result of citizen frustration with the handling of the crisis.  
For the COVID-19 crisis I chose documents from March 11, 2020, March 26, 2020, 
March 28, 2020, June 27, 2020, July 8, 2020, August 27, 2020, October 2, 2020, October 14, 
2020, and October 28, 2020. In March 2020, the first restrictions were put in place in Germany 
and the Robert Koch Institute confirmed exponential increase in COVID-19 cases. In June 2020, 
the EU Commission presented a strategy for a European wide vaccination program. In July, EU 
leaders agreed on a six-year recovery plan. In August, the EU provided loans and grants to 15 
Member States to protect citizens and mitigate the socioeconomic consequences of the 
pandemic. In October 2020, the EU disbursed more loans and grants to countries under the 
SURE program while also providing information on vaccine deployment (“Timeline” 2021).   
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As you can see each press document circles large events happening at both the German 
and EU level. I ended up with 27 documents in total.  
After selecting my samples, I began coding my data in order to determine how European 
unity and integration was portrayed by German leadership and government. I used the software 
NVivo to organize, code, and analyze my data. I first read through each document and identified 
who was speaking and their political affiliation (if they were a German politician). Then I went 
back and assigned each important phrase or passage with a specific code or codes. I decided to 
employ open and then axial coding, as defined by Strauss and Corbin 1998. Open coding 
uncovers, names, and develops concepts by closely examining discrete parts of text for 
similarities and differences (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 102). Then, axial coding was used to 
regroup the data, using the open-code categories to look for more analytical concepts (Babbie 
2014, 410). This multi-step coding process allowed me to look for broad themes as well as 
recurring discourse narratives more closely. The dual-coding process was particularly helpful in 
finding cross-crisis themes. After I finished coding my data, I shared my codebook and two 
documents (which had to be in English due to language restrictions) with a peer for validation. 
Validity involves checking whether you are measuring what you say you are measuring (Babbie 
2014, 430). While my codes did address my research questions, during validation I restructured 
my code book to include sub codes which allowed me to more descriptively analyze broad 
themes. My code book is represented in Table 1.  
Table 1 Code Sub-Code 
 
Economy and mobility • Economic policy or growth 
• Free movement 
European Culture of Stability • European Identity  
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German Leadership •  
Historical Connection • Future of Europe 
Inseparable • Germany compared to other EU member 
states 
International Cooperation •  
Right extremism •  
Social Responsibility of Nation 
States 
• Citizen cooperation with crisis protocols  
Systematic change • Crisis prevention  
 
 Other research methods I considered were in-depth qualitative interviews with experts 
(economists, migration studies scholars, and healthcare professionals) and a social media 
analysis of the public perception of German leadership through crises. However, there were 
several limitations I saw in using these methods which led me to decide against them. First, 
finding several experts in three fields and conducting lengthy interviews would be time 
consuming and limited in scope. I would have had to supplement their expert views with 
culturally specific interlocutors or other sources to gain the full picture of the German-European 
context. The social media analysis presents a similar issue of time and resource constraint, as 
well as a lack of institutional perceptive. Ultimately, using discourse analysis of government 
documents, which includes fielded questions from journalists, provides both an elite perspective 
as well as a limited media perspective to how the German government dealt with European 
crises.  
 The combination of a discourse analysis informed by a policy-narrative analysis approach 
with methods informed by archival research allowed me to tease out the far from straightforward 
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political frameworks Merkel and her government put forward. The intra-institutional frameworks 
at play are not homogenous and become entangled, especially when addressing questions of 
identity, mobility, and economic power between Germany and the European Union. Because of 
Germany’s position in the EU and the dominant role Merkel has had in policy creation, a 
historical-archival background was necessary to understand the intricacies of the complex 
objectives of the German government, both at the domestic and EU level. This coupled with my 
data collection and analysis provided a unique insight into the political perspective on crisis 
management.  
 Using meaningful scholarly research to inform my analysis I attempt to connect the 
























Literature Review: Continuous Crisis in the EU 
 
The European Union has dealt with three substantial crises in the last decade: the 
Eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis, and (currently) the COVID-19 crisis. These crises have 
challenged the project of a unified Europe, specifically its internal single market, the free 
movement of people and goods, and the idea of “European citizenship.” Germany, a political and 
economic leader in Europe, has led the Union through these moments of crisis. Germany is one 
of many international actors but is unique due its influential position at the supranational level. 
To understand Germany’s position in all three crises we need to contextualize the complex 
global processes of the Eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis. These 
contexts are also vital to understanding the surge of right-wing populism across Europe and how 
these crises have played a role in its rise to prominence. 
Crisis Theory 
 
The EU, a unique political entity, was set up in such a way to maintain peace on the 
continent; however, there has been discussion of the Union being in perpetual states of crisis. 
Crisis cannot simply be understood as static moments in history but rather should be understood 
as omnipresent dislocation in globalized societies, as local identities are subject to constant 
communal transformation (Nabers 2019, 270). Here, dislocation refers to dramatic shifts within 
apparently stable discourses of national homogeneity. Therefore, crises of certain degrees are a 
part of the social fabric; however, sudden events that impede on policy-makers ability to 
formulate a firm and coherent action plan result in instability.  
Since the end of the Cold War, European powers have faced crises in an effort to 
peacefully rebalance and change Europe (Wivel and Wæver 2018, 323). As new nations joined 
the European citizenry, new challenges arose, specifically in relation to “national uniformity.” 
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Policy makers under normal circumstances utilize time and resources to find the best solutions. 
But because in crisis scenarios there is often lack of information and a stress on time, decisions 
and policies implemented are subpar. To avoid this, institutions need to be able to predict crises 
and develop scenarios by examining and diagnosing weaknesses in administrative organization 
(Al 2020, 2). While crises are constitutive of society, institutions nevertheless need to be 
prepared to face momentary emergencies that are pejoratively deemed crisis. The Eurozone crisis 
embodies a globalized dislocation crisis, while the migrant crisis and COVID-19 crisis are more 
indicative of the momentary emergencies with long-lasting social impacts. 
Integration Theory  
 
 As stated on the onset of this project, the European Union has been a balance between 
integration and separation. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2021 discuss how European integration 
started from diversity, not identity, as a common aversion to war held the European community 
together (358). Because of the sparse attachment to a European identity, integration theorists 
have attempted to explain how the European Union has managed to remain a coherent 
cooperative. First, integration can be defined as an increase of joint policies and European 
institutions' ability make and implement decisions, against the will of individual Member States 
(Webber 2014, 342). Webber also includes integration as the number of EU Member States 
increasing; however, I do not see this as a sufficient measure of integration as including more 
nations in the Union does not lead to more integrative policies among existing members and 
could even be more indicative of disintegrative measures as national identity and histories must 
be brought in line with common European ideals. Disintegration therefore is the decline of joint 
policies and European institutions' ability make and implement decisions.  
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Main theories on European integration include neofunctionalism, postfunctionalism, and 
intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalism emphasizes path-dependency and spillovers — which 
suggests that integration in one sector would lead to integration others — and will result in more 
integration. The cyclical nature of neofunctionalism suggests that as European-level structures 
grow and transnational exchange increases, so too will the societal demand for these 
supranational structures. Therefore, neofunctionalism sets out a self-perpetuating system of 
socioeconomic institutional determinism where disintegration is virtually impossible (Webber 
2019, 1136). Because institutionalization prevents crisis induced collapse, there can never be true 
disintegration in a neofunctionalist framework.  
Postfunctionalist theory emphasizes that imbalances caused by crisis results in backlash 
driven by mass politicization, resulting in less integration (Schimmelfennig 2018, 972). Nation 
states’ broader need for cooperation with the narrower territorial scope of community causes 
tensions between the supranational European body and Member States, creating political 
cleavages that toe the Leaver-Stayer line seen in Brexit. Postfunctionalism takes into 
consideration the power of the nation state and national identity in comparison with the relative 
weakness of the European identity (Webber 2019, 1140-1141). Therefore, disintegration is likely 
due to the growth of identity politics and mass politicization.   
Liberal intergovernmentalism theorizes European integration as a process of inter-state 
bargaining in which governments are chiefly motivated by economic preferences (Hooghe and 
Marks 2019). Because there is an asymmetrical interdependence between nation states, the 
creation of supranational institutions is seen as a means of securing credible commitments from 
Member States (Webber 2019, 1136). Disintegration is very unlikely because this economic 
interdependence remains strong as a result of supranational cooperation.  
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The three aforementioned theories in integration either take a too optimistic or too 
pessimistic look at how crises impact European integration. As Schimmelfennig 2018 describes, 
“in the context of integration, [crises] present a manifest threat and a perceived significant 
probability of disintegration but may also trigger reform activities leading to more integration” 
(969). Crises are constitutive of society but are still massive disruptors of policy priorities. While 
there are many other theories that can be explored, the hegemonic-stability theory provides a 
more critical lens at which to look at the complexities of European integration. The hegemonic-
stability theory suggests that the overwhelming dominance of one country is a necessary 
condition for the maintenance of an open and stable regional economy (Webber 2014, 352). 
Germany’s economic and political position in the EU has given it a semi-hegemonic status in the 
EU and has incentivized integration efforts, but the recent increase in nationalism in the Federal 
Republic as well as across the EU is challenging the incentive for pro-European policies.  
Webber 2019 lays out three criteria for assessing if a state is a hegemonic power: “Does it 
play a pre-eminent role in setting the rules on which the system is based? Does it bear a 
disproportionate burden of the costs of maintaining the system, especially in crises? Does and 
can it mobilize (sufficient) support for its strategies to stabilize the system among other 
(‘follower’) states?” (1145). As I will show in the following chapters, Germany has filled these 
criteria throughout the 21st century and especially during crises. Until recently, France and 
Germany have been in a hegemonic duopoly working together to promote European political 
stability. After World War II, France was the political powerhouse in Europe, and Berlin, while 
in close partnership with Paris, defaulted to it as the political leader of Europe. Since 
reunification, however, Germany has increasingly become more economically powerful and 
more politically stable. The Franco-German partnership has remained vital to Europe throughout 
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the 21st century. France has strong connections to the Southern Europe while Germany has 
connections to Eastern Europe, and both are economically and politically strong. 
 Unlike other regional hegemons such as the United States or China, Germany does not 
dominate Europe militarily, demographically, or financially, especially because the German 
political system disperses rather than centralizes power (Webber 2019, 1146). Therefore, many 
scholars suggest Germany maintains a semi-hegemonic position in Europe, which has been 
critical to the stability in times of crisis. This stability has rested on Germany’s commitment and 
incentives to pro-integrationist policies. Germany’s national socialist past along with its reliance 
as an export economy on European partners has driven integration policies at the EU level; 
however, over the last decade of crisis and mass politicization at home and abroad has called for 
more domestic initiatives to be made. The future of European political integration is more 
contingent than traditional theoretical approaches suggest. 
The Eurozone Crisis 
 
The Eurozone is an economic project to reduce trade barriers as much as it is a political 
project to unite the continent, according to Lemke 2014. Galpin 2015 and Hertner and 
Miskimmon 2015 use Germany's historical experience with European integration to analyze 
German leaders’ commitment to the European project. Galpin 2015 draws on Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl’s support for a single currency, which he related to overcoming the militaristic and 
nationalistic past by tying a united Germany closely to Europe. This same commitment to 
Europe is used by Hertner and Miskimmon 2012 to describe Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
narrative on addressing the Eurozone crisis, as Merkel constantly repeated “When the euro fails, 
Europe fails” during speeches. Lemke 2014 and Galpin 2015 both discuss Germany’s strict 
austerity position and Ordnungspolitik (ordoliberalism), a German variant of neoliberalism 
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which focuses on regulated markets for competitiveness, budgetary discipline, and individual 
responsibility, in framing how the country addressed the crisis. Germany is highly invested in the 
Eurozone and its success as its status as an export country depends on the euro. More than two-
thirds of German trade is exchanged within the EU (Lemke 2014, 20). Schild 2013 adds the 
importance of the Franco-German alliance during the euro crisis. Germany and France’s high 
GDP and shares of the Central European Bank allowed them to take leadership in the 2009 crisis 
and push forward the European Stability Mechanism, the European semester (a tighter European 
fiscal surveillance), and an “euro plus pact” to improve economic policy coordination (Schild 
2013). 
To deal with the crisis throughout the Union, the EU established the European Financial 
Stability Facility in May 2010 to coordinate and administer financial assistance. This was 
replaced by the European Stability Mechanism in October 2012 which became the permanent 
institution for financial assistance; however, creditor countries (Germany, France) wanted 
receiving countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) to meet preconditions for rescue packages. The 
Fiscal Compact, which subjected receiving countries to strict austerity measures, was signed in 
March 2012. All of these measures greatly raised the institutional powers of the EU and brought 
the legitimacy of the supra-state organization into question (Lemke 2014). 
The Migrant Crisis 
 
The legitimacy of the EU was further scrutinized in 2015 when the migrant crisis reached 
an apex and the supranational institution failed to implement comprehensive, union-wide 
policies. Nedergaard 2019 describes how the Schengen states had abolished the internal borders 
between them for the security of external borders, yet different traditions pertaining to the rule of 
law between Member States lead to divergent border security strategies. This has presented 
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serious challenges for cooperation for refugee policy due to the difference between countries 
regarding the mobility of citizens, refugees, and asylum seekers in a time of border crisis 
(Nedergaard 2019, 83). Kushnir et al. 2020 reiterate these sentiments in European Groupings of 
Territorial Cooperation, or Euroregions, the border zones between countries, after the 2015 
migrant crisis. The crisis made enlargement unattractive and strained relationships with existing 
Member States because of border policies implemented at national levels. 
Merkel’s leadership and Germany’s economic and political standing in the EU allowed 
for a strong response to the 2015 migrant crisis. Mushaben 2017 describes Merkel’s leadership in 
Germany’s migration policy. Liberalizing Germany’s historically restrictive migration policies 
from the 1990s has been a priority since she took office in 2005, convening the first National 
Integration Plan in 2006, expanding it in 2012, and introducing widespread reform in 2013. In 
2015 she kept the borders open to refugees coming from Hungary, resulting in an outpouring of 
citizen engagement and “welcome culture.” However, after opening the borders and letting in 
over 1.2 million asylum seekers, there was major social and political backlash. In March 2016, 
the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 11.7 percent of the vote in Rhineland-Pfalz, 14.9 percent 
in Baden-Württemberg, and 24 percent in Sachsen-Anhalt. Merkel also faced electoral setbacks 
in her home state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the AfD garnered 20.8 percent of the 
vote in 2016. In 2018, Merkel had to concede on an open-door refugee policy to maintain her 
coalition government, agreeing to set up transit centers for asylum seekers to stay in before they 
were approved for legal entry. This caused backlash from the political left and the public, who 
were advocating for asylum seekers human rights and Germany’s moral and humanitarian 
mission (Petzinger 2018). Merkel announced in October 2018 that she would be stepping down 
as the head of the Christian Democratic Union and would not seek re-election as Chancellor after 
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electoral setbacks. Laubenthal 2019 describes Germany as a selectively liberal immigration 
country, meaning the country balances the view of migrants as helpful (to fulfill labor shortages) 
and problematic (dangerous and draining on social welfare). Laubenthal contends that while 
there have been problematic policies put in place, especially between 2013 and 2017, there has 
been a proactive approach to immigration reform and policy implementation. Additionally, more 
restrictions to asylum policy passed through the Bundesrat in 2019. Germany took the Council of 
the EU’s Presidency from July 2020 to December 2020, where uniting the EU’s refugee and 
asylum policy was one of Merkel’s main priorities; however, combating the massive economic 
and social toll of the coronavirus pandemic obviously took precedent (Angela 2020). 
Within the EU, Germany took a leading role in the EU-Turkey deal, combining domestic 
and foreign policy goals in the talks. EU-Turkey relations were questionable due to accession 
talks being at a standstill. Turkey’s democratic performance was endangering its compliance 
with the Copenhagen Criteria, necessary requirements to become a Member State, but the EU 
still needed a strategic partnership with the nation (Saatçioğlu 2020). Reiners and Takin 2020 
describe the historical German-Turkish relations which allowed for a leading role in the EU-
Turkey deal, which provided a three-billion euro aid package to Turkey as well as reinvigorated 
accession talks. These connections are through Turkish diaspora living in Germany as well as the 
established economic and political partnerships between the two countries.  
Migration is still a leading topic in Germany and the EU, especially during the 
coronavirus pandemic as asylum seekers face increased risks and closed borders. 
The Coronavirus Crisis 
 
The COVID-19 crisis in many ways is a combination of the economic crisis, the migrant 
crisis, with an additional healthcare crisis. Brinks and Ibert 2020 contextualize crisis 
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management in the era of coronavirus. They claim crises are performative, as they have to be 
declared as urgent, uncertain, and threatening to the population. Nationally there has been limited 
scholarly articles on COVID-19 and the German response. However, there has been analysis of 
how the spread of COVID-19 occurred in Germany by Kübart and Stabler 2020 and Jung et al. 
2020. On January 27, the first case of COVID-19 was detected in Germany. On March 17, the 
Robert Koch Institute classified the risk situation for Germany as moderate to high. At this point, 
there were already more than 9,000 confirmed cases and 26 COVID-19-related deaths in 
Germany. On March 23 severe social restrictions and a “lockdown” was put in place, initially for 
two weeks. Regions have been lifting and imposing these restrictions ad hoc based on local case 
numbers (Krieger et al 2020). As of April 11, 2021, Germany is in the midst of a third wave of 
coronavirus, with 13,245 new cases reported, according to the New York Times. 
Benton 2020 further describes what life will look like after the COVID-19 pandemic has 
subsided, and how lifting travel restrictions will be slow and conflicting. Many countries will be 
forced to prioritize different kinds of movement, whether they are reliant on tourism, migrant 
labor, or business travel. Similarly, mobility will likely have to be pushed towards automation, 
including facial recognition, touchless border crossings, and contactless baggage check. Ethical 
dilemmas when discussing these “safer” options for travel and mobility is put into context as 
well — as a privilege of the elite. As a vaccine or treatment becomes available, Benton 2020 
expresses that this will further marginalize those already pushed to the fringes of movement and 
mobility.  
The European Medicines Agency authorized the BioNTech/Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine 
December 21, 2020. Moderna’s vaccine is going through an application for marketing 
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authorization, to be decided January 6, 2021 (Dimitrova 2020). Vaccine passports have been 
authorized to travel in the European Union.  
Like during the Eurozone crisis, France and Germany agreed on a 500 billion EU bond 
and Multiannual Financial Framework. This is historic, as Germany abandoned its refusal to 
accept EU-wide borrowing and the Franco-German alliance had been revitalized after laying 
relatively latent, both within EU and foreign political initiatives. In terms of moving Europe 
forward from the COVID-19 pandemic, France’s leader Emmanuel Macron’s European vision 
matched with Germany’s international perception as “most responsive” makes this coalition vital 
(Puglierin and Franke 2020).  
Past pandemics, namely the SARS and MERS epidemics help fill in gaps due to the 
contemporary nature of the coronavirus pandemic and how governments are addressing it. 
Ibrahim 2007 describes how health communication in Singapore during the 2003 SARS 
epidemic was heavily framed in military and war language, allowing for severe and even 
“draconian” measures to be taken by the government to secure borders and take swift action 
(Ibrahim 2007). Understanding the governmental framing of past pandemics is important in my 
analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic and how leaders are impacting movement and freedoms. 
Right-wing Populism 
 
These crises have led to a rise of right-wing populist parties. Baier 2016 makes the 
distinction between right-wing radicalism and right-wing populism, an important distinction in 
this project. According to Baier, right-wing radicalism encompasses parties and groups that 
position themselves on the margin of the political spectrum, use violence, and usually relate to 
the tradition of national socialism. Right-wing populism or modernized far-right politics claim to 
operate in the framework of parliamentary democracy and rhetorically distance themselves from 
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extremism. Right-wing populists have an authoritarian conception of society, an ethnic sense of 
nationalism (namely xenophobia, racism, and anti-Europeanism), and what Baier 2016 calls a 
social chauvinism, meaning a belief that the social welfare system is exclusively for nationals. 
Within right-wing populist parties there is still the basic rejection of a multicultural or 
heterogeneous society. For this project, I will focus on right-wing populist movements that have 
attained EU parliamentary victory. Within the European Parliament there are three party groups 
that have right-wing populist members: The European Conservatives and Reformists, Identity 
and Democracy, and the Non-Inscrits. 
The European Conservatives and Reformists 
 
The European Conservatives and Reformists parties’ that can be considered right-wing 
populist and have gained parliamentary victory include: New Flemish Alliance (Belgium), 
Bulgarian National Movement (Bulgaria), Croatian Conservative Party (Croatia), Civic 
Democratic Party (Czechia), Brothers of Italy (Italy), National Alliance "All for Latvia! – For 
Fatherland and Freedom" (Latvia), Forum for Democracy (Netherlands), Christian Union-
Reformed Political Party (Netherlands), Law and Justice Party (Poland), VOX (Spain), and the 
Sweden Democrats (Sweden). 
The New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) had an impressive electoral growth from 4.8 percent 
in 2003 to 31.9 percent in the 2014 elections, becoming the largest party in Belgium and entering 
regional and federal coalitions governments (Abts et al. 2019). N-VA also won three seats in the 
2019 EU parliamentary elections with 13.7 percent of the vote. The party advocates for a 
radicalization of Flemish nationalism and for the establishment of an independent Republic of 
Flanders. 
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The Law and Justice party won an outright parliamentary majority in the Polish 2015 
elections and employed an anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric that almost completely shut 
out asylum seekers and refugees (Szczerbiak 2017, 404). Seven thousand migrants were 
relocated to Poland in-line with the EU Council’s relocation scheme, but Law and Justice said 
that this figure was unrealistic because family members would be able to join initial arrivals and 
that it would be used as a precedent to force Poland to take in additional migrants in the future 
(ibid, 412). In 2019, Law and Justice won 26 seats in European Parliament with 45.4 percent of 
the national vote. 
The Sweden Democrats first appeared in politics in 2002 and became the third largest 
party in Sweden in 2014 despite other established parties refusing to cooperate or enter into 
coalitions with them (Loxbo and Bolin 2016, 171). The Sweden Democrats received 15.3 percent 
of the vote in the 2019 EU parliamentary elections and received three seats. 
In Spain, both right- and left-wing populism have emerged after the 2008 Eurozone 
crisis. VOX inhabits the right-wing and calls for the immediate deportation of undocumented 
migrants and an end to social policies aimed at integrating migrants (Vampa 2020). Territorial 
issues play a large role in elections in Spain, and VOX is most electorally powerful where “sub-
state territorial demands have been weaker,” that is to say where sovereignty is not in question 
like in Catalonia (ibid). VOX received 6.3 percent of the 2019 EU parliamentary vote and 
received three seats. 
Identity and Democracy 
 
Right-wing populist parties in Identity and Democracy consists of: The Freedom Party of 
Austria (Austria), Flemish Importance (Belgium), Freedom and Direct Democracy (Czechia), 
Danish People’s Party (Denmark), The Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE, Estonia), 
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Finns Party, formally the True Finns (Finland), National Rally, formally National Front (France), 
Alternative for Germany (Germany), and Lega Nord (Italy). 
Jacoby et al. 2017 suggest that the rise of populist parties are challenging Austria’s 
existing party systems and classic coalition formulas around Europe. Austria, where coalitions 
have been the crux of government formation since the end of the WWII, has overused 
clientelism, the opportunity for parties to channel benefits to their constituencies and enjoy the 
benefits themselves, leaving Austrian grand coalitions an ineffective sterilization tool. 
Sterilization in this sense relates to the coalition's ability to exclude populist parties (both from 
the left and the right) from government. The Freedom Party of Austria surged in polls and almost 
won the presidency in 2017 due to their hard line policies against immigration. In 2019 the FPÖ 
won 17.2 percent of the vote and received three EU parliament seats. 
The Danish People’s Party is founded on the principles that migrants are: a threat to 
homogeneous and peaceful Danish nation, as well as to Daish culture and norms; believed to 
lead to increase in crime; and are a drain on social welfare (Rydgren 2004). According to 
Rydgren, there was a convergence of the major parties regarding socio-economic problems, 
which depoliticized these issues and instead mobilized socio-cultural politics around issues like 
migration, allowing the Danish People's Party to gain popularity (ibid, 498). In 2019, the Danish 
People’s Party won 10.8 percent of the EU parliamentary vote and received one seat. 
Petsinis 2019 describes that the Estonian Conservatives People’s Party interlinks the 
collective memories of “colonization” under the Soviets with the collective anxieties of 
becoming colonized again by the EU in the future. These fears are woven into national rhetoric 
and anti-immigration sentiments that have proven effective. EKRE was the third most popular 
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party in 2017 and received 12.7 percent of the vote in the 2019 EU parliamentary elections, 
giving them one seat. 
Arter 2010 suggests that supporters of the Finns Party see them as a center-right or left-
leaning populist party due to the commitment to universal social welfare, it is clear that the 
party’s nativism, anti-establishment sentiments, and traditionalist values solidify the Finns Party 
position as a right-wing populist party. Founded in 1995, the Finns Party has been a proponent of 
traditional families (against same-sex relationships), against integration of immigrants into 
society, but for national social welfare and healthcare for Finnish citizens. In 2019 they received 
13.8 percent of the vote for EU parliamentary elections and two seats. 
The National Rally, formerly known as the National Front, is a keystone European right-
wing populist party. Jean-Marie Le Pen founded the party to unify marginalized far-right 
movements and although he gained some electoral success, France’s majoritarian two-round 
system essentially prohibits the National Rally from winning a plurality or majority of seats 
(Surel 2019). Marie Le Pain has worked on “de-demonizing” the party and continues its electoral 
viability by positioning itself around: ‘the people’ constitute; the dangerous elite institutions that 
have betrayed the interests of sovereign people; and the return to a golden age in France in which 
society had authentic habits and beliefs (ibid, 243). The National Rally received 23.3 percent of 
the 2019 EU parliamentary vote and received 22 seats. 
Lega Nord is a populist regionalist movement that has grown from calls for a sovereign 
region of Padania to a more encompassing return to Italian sovereignty from Europe. Newth 
2019 and Brunazzo and Mascitelli 2020 describe how Lega Nord used the concept of Padania to 
more narrowly define citizenship and campaign against racial and ethnic minorities. Lega Nord 
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won 34.2 percent of the vote in the 2019 European parliamentary elections, affording them 28 
seats. 
The Alternative for Germany blends populist anti-elitism with nativist alarmism 
according to Donovan 2020. The party orients itself around a basic people versus elite framing 
that emphasizes eastern disenfranchisement, making the AfD strong in eastern German states. 
The party was the third most popular party in 2017 and won 11 percent of the vote in the 2019 
EU parliamentary elections, receiving 11 seats 
The Non-Inscrits 
 
The Non-Inscrits parties’ that can be classified as right-wing populist include: Mislav 
Kolakusic (Croatia), Popular Association—Golden Dawn (Greece), The Movement for a Better 
Hungary (Jobbik; Hungary), Five Star Movement (Italy), Slovak National Party (Slovakia), 
Brexit Party (UK), and the Democratic Unionist Party (UK). The Non-Inscrits are unattached 
members of the European Parliament.  
 The Five Star Movement in Italy is anti-establishment and refused to enter into coalition 
negotiations until 2018. According to Mosca and Tronconi 2019, the Five Star Movement eludes 
most common classifications of populist parties on both sides of the political spectrum because 
of the party’s dichotomous stances on socioeconomic and sociocultural issues. In the 2019 EU 
parliamentary elections the party won 17.1 percent of the vote and 14 seats. 
Pytlas 2013 describes the historical myths and narratives that construct nativism in 
Slovakia and Hungary. The Slovak National Party program revolves around nativist, anti-
minority directed at Roma and Hungarian populations and populist anti-establishment rhetoric. 
There is wide-spread sentiment that Hungarians believe Slovakia is still under their control, 
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which increases nativist sentiments (Pytlas 2013, 174). The Slovak National Party received 12.1 
percent of the vote in the 2019 EU parliamentary elections, giving them two seats. 
According to Cutts et al. 2019, the 2019 EU parliamentary elections in Britain was seen 
as a proxy second referendum to the 2016 Leave-Remain vote. The six-week old Brexit Party, 
led by Nigel Farage, finished with 30.8 percent of the vote with hard attacks on “the 
Establishment.” This afforded the Brexit Party 29 seats in the European parliament despite the 
UK leaving the European Union officially at the beginning of 2021. 
Right-wing Populism in Germany 
 
Mainstream parties in Europe have failed to address the economic crisis that began in 
2008 and the migrant crisis that began in 2015, creating economic anxiety and anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Grzymala-Busse 2019). This has made voters vulnerable to populist appeals such as 
reclaiming national sovereignty from European institutions and distributing social welfare 
exclusively to national citizens. Hayes and Dudek 2020 explain that although Germany has 
generally had short-lived, electorally insignificant radical right-wing parties, prolonged states of 
crisis has allowed the radical right to take electoral strongholds. Due to Germany’s Nazi past, it 
has a collective memory of vergangenheitsbewältigung, the struggle to work off the past, which 
differs in the East and West. This collective consciousness is based on shame and reparations for 
World War II victims, which inhibited the development and acceptance of radical right-wing 
parties. Denazification efforts differed in East and West Germany. West Germany 
institutionalized shame, yet still employed former NS-officials while East Germany emphasis 
was on the struggle between communism and fascism. The differences in the denazification 
processes, along with remaining socioeconomic divides, has manifested in radical right-wing 
parties and preferences being significantly higher in former East German federal states.  
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Throughout Western Europe, there has been a policy of Ausgrenzung or cordon-sanitair, 
which means coalitions do not go into agreements with right-wing populist parties. Political 
actions is combined with sustained social mobilizations, through peaceful public demonstrations 
and the media. This looks like denouncing racist and xenophobic rhetoric and outright refusal to 
recognize right-wing populist parties. Because this social mobilization must be sustained and the 
anti-elite rhetoric of the radical right fits into this narrative of social exclusion, parties have been 
able to garner support and even cooperate with other mainstream political parties. This has led to 
normalization and widespread consolidation of right-wing populist parties throughout Europe, as 
shown above. Importantly, the Eurozone crisis and migrant crisis were important catalysis in 
right-wing popularity, as mainstream parties “failed” to handle the crises adequately.  
Despite a collective rejection of right-wing political parties, the AfD became the third 
largest party in the Bundestag in 2017, and for the first time since the early 1950s, held viable 
political space to the right of the dominant Christian Democratic Union. Lees 2018 describes the 
rise of AfD, which was founded in 2013 when Germany and the rest of Europe was coming out 
of the euro crisis, as an anti-elitist party for “the people.” At this point, the AfD was not an anti-
European party, but that quickly shifted as Germany and Europe faced the migrant crisis in 2015. 
Art 2018 posits that the rise of the AfD was a direct product of Merkel’s actions and policies 
taken to combat the Eurozone crisis. Because the radical right was of little political consequence 
during this time, Merkel did not consider their political backlash (Art 2018, 77). Routinely 
describing  her policy initiatives as alternativlos (unavoidable), Merkel’s government directive 
led to the foundation of the Alternative for Germany, whose party name plays on the chancellor's 
own rhetoric. 
My research will add to work on crisis management, mobility, and European integration. 
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Context: The European Project  
 
Piepenschneider 2015 describes the driving forces behind European unification after 
World War II as: peacekeeping; belonging to a community of values; increasing economic 
prosperity; and more influence in foreign and security policy. The legacy of World War II has 
left Member States with different historical grievances and memories, making the establishment 
of a European society with common values challenging. Petrović 2019 explains that this official 
EU narrative of a peaceful and prosperous integration was met immediately by Euroscepticism 
and nationalism. European integration has grown in tandem with Euroscepticism, as both rely on 
narratives of the recent past to either establish and justify a strong supranational community or 
national sovereignty. Therefore, when citizens imagine Europe, they imagine both the 
international community but also their own national contexts within broader European history. 
The establishment of the European Union as a supra-state organization rescaled state powers and 
lowered the significance of internal borders (Paasi 2014, 4). This supra-state organization 
allowed for region building that gave individual nation states certain powers but ultimately, 
members of the European Union relinquished sovereignty for continental stability. The power 
dynamics between nations and the EU are imbalanced and cause local tensions. To understand 
the European project, we must understand these power dynamics and how a European identity 
was constructed in order to combat nationalism and skepticism.  
History of the EU 
 
The creation of the European Union, the introduction of European citizenship, and the 
euro started the process of establishing a concrete European identity (Petrovic 2019). However, 
national memories impact what it means to be European and how that identity takes shape. 
France and Germany created a strong relationship linked by the European Coal and Steel 
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Community of 1951, which became the basis for a European Union. While free trade agreements 
were the basis of European integration, these negotiations had wider political purposes. Thym 
2016 describes how economic integration was the first building block to a European federation 
and is what led to the discussion of the free movement of people along with goods and services. 
Schmuck 2015 adds that Member States must understand the European project as a community 
of interests, must have the same opinions about what it means to be part of that community, and 
must have common goals in order to strengthen the Union and maintain cohesion. Because of the 
local, national, and supranational alliances citizens have, leaders need to work together to avoid 
disjointed and contradicting policy. However, coordinating these interests have proved difficult 
as the economic, social, and political interests have varied among Member States. The Treaty of 
Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EC) in 1958, aimed to build a 
common market, improve living conditions, gradually align economic policies, promote 
cooperation between members, and improve cooperation with other states. The treaty also made 
no distinction between an EU citizen and a third country national, but only recognized “worker,” 
emphasizing the EC’s commitment to economic integration and stability (Thym 2016, 303). 
However, migration policy was still the nation states mandate, causing tensions at the 
supranational level with guest workers moving throughout the EC. This shifted in the 1980s 
when migration entered the EU framework. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 formally established the EU and the Copenhagen Criteria, which stipulates how 
candidate countries can ascend into the Union. During this time the Union expanded to include 
former Soviet countries and a reunified Germany. The Maastricht Treaty also formally 
introduced EU citizenship and specific rules for “nationals of third countries.”  
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Since 1951 and the first trade agreement, European identity and integration was a 
political goal. While there was increasing expansion of mobility rights and integration efforts, 
Member States still have their own historical contexts to the Union; Germany and France are the 
founders and therefore push for stability; Spain and Greece joined after right-wing dictatorships 
fell to democratic regimes; and ex-Soviet countries tentatively agreed to give up sovereignty to 
another supranational polity. These different national identities join under one European identity. 
Therefore, in the words of the German constitutional court, “the citizenship of the Union is 
nothing, which culturally or normatively precedes the EU Treaties. One might conclude, 
therefore, that Union citizenship pretends to be more than it is” (Thym 2016, 302).  
European Citizenship 
 
  Brändle 2020 defines citizenship as “a relationship between individuals and a political 
community,” but conceded that there is tension in the EU because there is not one political 
authority which regulates the dynamics of in- and exclusion. This tension is a result of unequal 
socioeconomic status across the European Union. European citizenship was formally established 
by the Maastricht Treaty and has cultural and civic components. Sikoldi 2015 describes that a 
citizens’ sense of belonging to the European continent is shaped by cultural, social, and ethnic 
similarities, while the civic component comes from identification with the EU’s political 
structures, institutions, rights, and rules. Sikoldi 2015, Thym 2016, and Brändle 2020 all describe 
that citizens’ understanding of their mobility rights (stemming from their civic component of 
identity) shape how they understand and feel about being EU citizens. Plainly, citizens gain 
access to the biggest right granted by EU citizenship when they become mobile.  
EU citizenship is built on citizens’ ability to capitalize on their right to free movement, 
and these rights are dependent on economic resources and educational attainment. Sikoldi 2015 
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suggests that intra-EU mobility enhances individuals connection with their EU identity, 
including non-citizens, and assists in managing the multiple layers of this identity, including 
social factors such as gender and age as well as the local, national, EU, and cosmopolitan levels 
of identity. Northern and Western countries are historically better educated and wealthier and 
therefore can activate their EU citizenship more easily than Southern and Eastern countries, 
which apart from some recently ascending to the European Union, were also hit hardest by the 
Eurozone crisis in 2008. And while intra-EU mobility is facilitated by EU citizenship, Brändle 
2020 suggests that national and local contexts still dominate the ways in which rights, access to 
welfare, and economic participation in another EU member state can be practiced. After 
capitalizing on their right to free movement, people’s understanding of themselves as foreigners 
or as integrated locals in their new nation impacts how they view their EU citizenship and sense 
of belonging.  
 Citizens of Member States are automatically granted EU citizenship, but there are many 
more third country nationals who reside in the EU who also want to capitalize on the 
fundamental right of free movement. Only after the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 
did the EU expressly govern the status and intra-EU mobility of third country nationals (Della 
Torre 2018, 1413). Thym 2016 describes that EU law mandates equal treatment for foreigners 
and nationals, so once living in Europe the differences between foreigner and citizen begin to 
disappear over time. After five years of legal residency, third-country nationals with “sufficient 
resources” obtain the right to long-term residence status, which grants access to the labor market, 
enhanced protection against expulsion, and the option of intra-EU mobility (Thym 2016, 314-
315). However, until third country nationals obtain long-term residency status, they are required 
to stay in the host Member State or risk losing status. Della Torre 2018 describes how this 
 38 
confines migrants to a “spatial–temporal waiting zone,” preventing third country nationals from 
integrating and pursuing jobs elsewhere in Europe. Once granted long-term status and access to 
the labor market, third country nationals are still marginalized. They are what Thym 2016 calls 
depoliticized denizenship, or a group of people who benefit from economic and social integration 
without being granted political participation. Carmel 2013 adds that the European Union plays a 
significant role in regulating mobility rights in ways which undermine the rights accessible to 
migrants and that the distribution of rights for citizens and non-citizens within its territory are 
uneven. The EU is based on equal treatment and freedom of movement, but there are 
discrepancies in who gets to access mobility based on citizenship.  
Mobility 
 
The European Community, established by the Treaty of Rome, guaranteed the free 
movement of capital, goods, services, and people. While the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 abolished 
the EC and replaced its roles with the wider EU framework, these four pillars of movement are 
still fundamental to the success of the European Union. These freedoms are both why countries 
want to join the Common Market and the EU and also why they want to leave it. The lack of 
internal borders has caused tension about who is allowed to move freely within the EU, who is 
granted EU citizenship, and whether or not Member States or supranational institutions are 
responsible for regulating movement. Therefore, understanding mobility in the EU and the 
Schengen Area is vital in understanding the European Project.   
Mobility can be defined as the embodied as well as physical movement experienced by 
people. This encapsulates the physical and emotional experiences of crossing borders as well as 
social identity and economic capital that are vital to mobility experiences. While mobility is not 
just the physical ability to move — it also includes communication, ideas, social class, and 
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identity — physical mobility is deemed socially valuable. Mobility is a signifier of social capital 
and, according to Urry 2012 and Gössling and Stavrinidi 2016, a precondition for social 
belonging. But there are immense barriers to movement due to unequal access to time, wealth, 
and safety. Therefore, movement in general is heavily securitized and monitored by in-groups, 
seen at the external European border. Migration policies at the European level are implemented 
in order to allow free movement within the Schengen Area, but these policies come at the price 
of higher border securitization practices at the external border, border outsourcing to other 
countries like Libya and Turkey, and economic incentives which uphold imperialist relationships 
between the European Union and neighboring countries.  
Johnson et al. 2011 describe how borders are “historically contingent and characterized 
by contextualized features and power relations” (62). To stabilize Europe, national discourses 
over borders needed to be quelled and a unified conception of them had to be adopted. The 
formal performance of the border, the description and defense of the EU’s external border, as 
well as the popular performance of borders, the political and public contestation over the 
meaning of the border, have both come under pressure from crises in the Union and Schengen 
Area alike (Johnson et al. 2011, 63). Because European and national discourse over borders are 
constantly in discussion, historical contexts and particularities often get misconstrued. The 
supranational border discourse emphasizes strengthening the external border to allow Europe to 
flourish while national and right-wing parties capitalized on citizens’ fear to advocate for strict 
migration and border policy. These differing performances of the border increase the imbalances 
between national and supranational agendas concerning border policy. 
The Schengen Area, which includes 26 countries, is not synonymous with the European 
Union; however, the Area is vital to the mobility experienced within the EU. The only EU 
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countries not in the Schengen Area are Ireland and the most recently ascended countries 
(Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus). Non-EU countries included in the Schengen Area 
are  Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein (“Brief” 2020). Schengen states have agreed 
to the core idea of free movement and renounced permanent border checks. However, there are 
still certain circumstances in which non-systemic police checks for immigration or crime control 
purposes in border areas are deemed legitimate (Van der Woude 2020, 115). As internal borders 
were opened, the perception of increased crime and irregular migration strengthened control on 
external borders. Protecting external borders to guarantee free movement in Europe is at the 
basis of migration policies in Europe and the use of databases such as the Schengen Information 
System and the European Dactylography System are used to track intra-Schengen movement 
(ibid, 117). Increased policing and securitization always impacts the most vulnerable 
populations, and while political discourse surrounds these measures to protect “freedoms” we 
must always ask: for who? Member States grant citizenship and include who is in the European 
imaginary and systematically exclude along race, ethnic, and class lines. External borders have 
been pushed from the edges of the European Union into Turkey and Libya, where EU policies 
are implemented to vet asylum seekers and police borders, upholding global migration injustices.  
European border policy focuses on protecting the distant external border, Member States 
still have large control over intra-Schengen border policies, challenging the strength and unity of 
the Schengen acquis (ibid, 123-124). Schengen Border Control 20 states that any control, 
whether systemic or by spot checks, carried out for the sole reason of crossing an internal border 
violates the idea of the Schengen Area. However, SBC 23 allows countries to exercise police 
power under national law and to carry out identity checks in intra-Schengen border zones, as 
long as: “the exercise of these powers cannot be considered equivalent to the exercise of border 
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checks, the police measures do not have border control as an objective, are based on general 
police information and experience regarding possible threats to public security and aim, in 
particular, to combat cross-border crime and, lastly, as long as the measures are devised and 
executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders 
and are carried out on the basis of spot-checks (ibid, 118). While SBC 23 gives provisions on 
how police can exercise border control, it is contradictory in upholding free movement between 
Schengen states. Not only is there ethno-racial concerns on how border policing is conducted, 
but there is a clear power imbalance between supra-state and state actors, giving nation states 
more power over movement, emphasizing tensions between national and supranational 
institutions. 
 Since the Eurozone crisis beginning in 2008, there has been a new complexity of 
migratory flows as globalization interconnects societies, both within the EU and outside of it 
(Trenz and Triandafyllidou 2017, 550). Migration throughout Europe has followed patterns, 
although Member States have experienced mobility and migration flows differently. East-West 
migration has been historically subdued and criminalized, making border security in countries 
like Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria a policy emphasis before ascension into the Schengen Area 
is granted. However, in states that were formerly in the Soviet Union, the EU’s call for 
debordering still has an intimidating connotation for residents, signaling the fragility of 
sovereignty and the urge to comply with a supranational body (Bürkner 2020, 560). Other crises 
such as the migrant crisis beginning in 2015 and the COVID-19 crisis beginning in 2020 have 
impacted movement in the Schengen Area. Tensions over open internal borders and hard 
external borders have been simplified to rhetoric around good and bad Europeans. This has 
resulted in reducing the need for European integration and trust, as failed member states are 
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rebordered outside of the Schengen Area and preferred accession states are included and 
debordered (Bürkner 2020, 555).  
Although mobility is a keystone in accessing European integration, member states are 
responsible for the implementation and operational administrative capacity surrounding 
migration (Schimmelfennig 2018, 985). Instead of bolstering EU institutions with the power to 
dictate Union wide migration and mobility policy, crises have emboldened national border and 
migration policy. Jean Monnet, a founding father of European integration, claimed to have 
“always believed that Europe would be built through crises, and that it would be the sum of their 
solutions,” and that “people only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only 
recognize necessity when a crisis is upon them” (Monnet 1978, 417). After the Eurozone crisis, 
integrative economic policies were institutionalized at the supranational level, but migration 
policies have been neglected after the migrant crisis. While the coronavirus continues to halt 
movement, it is imperative the EU addresses flaws in mobility throughout the Union. 
EU Institutions 
 
The four main European institutions are the European Commission, the European 
Council, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament. The European Commission is the 
only institution that represents the entire interest of the EU through the implementation of the 
policy and the EU budget. The Commission is also the main governing body as it is the 
politically independent executive branch of the EU. The European Council decides on the 
general direction and political priorities of the EU but does not pass laws. The European Council 
consists of the heads of state and government of all EU countries, the President of the European 
Council, and the President of the European Commission. The Council of the EU negotiates and 
adopts EU laws together with the European Parliament on the basis of proposals from the 
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European Commission. The European Parliament adopts EU laws together with the Council of 
the EU based on proposals from the European Commission. The Parliament is elected directly by 
EU voters every 5 years and provides democratic oversight over other EU institutions (Schmuck 
2015). The supranational character of the EU establishes power over the Member States as 
countries relinquish certain sovereignties in order to work together. Countries and citizens 
understand some EU rights, known as primary rights, supersede national rights, known as 
secondary rights, in order for the EU to be an established legal entity. Gaining and 
renouncing sovereignty creates an interdependent international community. 
Germany and European Integration 
 
         After the Second World War, West Germany began integrating into democratic 
Europe. West Germany was occupied by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, 
with limited sovereignty and a controlled economy which maintained only a basic supply of 
necessary goods for the population. In June 1948, a currency reform brought a better relation 
between goods and money, spearheaded by Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard. However, the 
exchange of Reichsmarks for Deutsche Mark was ten to one. German citizens gave up their 
savings and trusted in a new government in hopes for a better, stabler future. This trust in the 
German economy and German international standing enabled the emergence of a social market 
economy in which the state was allowed to act alone in the free market, bringing about the well-
known Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle. This allowed Germany to recover from the 
Second World War and establish itself in the European market (Schmuck 2015). The strength in 
the German economy and culture of trust in its ordoliberal system remains today. German 
ordoliberalism focuses on regulated markets for competitiveness, budgetary discipline, and 
individual responsibility (Galpin 2015). Germany remained an occupied country for 10 years 
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after World War II until the signing of the General Treaty or the Deutschlandvertrag. This 
established the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state and West Germany joined 
NATO, establishing itself as a trusted western ally. 
The Cold War was significant in integrating West Germany into Europe. Specifically, the 
Korean War brought Germany back to an export country and allowed Germany to start 
manufacturing and exporting steel, armored weapons, and bombs which accelerated the economy 
(Weber 2013). Since, Germany has maintained itself as an export country, 59 percent of exports 
going to other European countries. After the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended, German 
reunification resolidified Germany’s commitment to Europe. With the European Union 
established in 1993, German leaders looked to the future. While West versus East dominated 
European discourse for much of the 20th century, moving into the 21st century leaders across 
Europe were trying to define the European Union in a new way. Germany specifically was trying 
to become a more assertive leader but debates about the “normalization” of decisive foreign 
policy and “military de-tabooization” rested on an image of Germany becoming a traditional 
power-state again (Wivel and Wæver 2018, 322). However, Germany has established EU-
centered policies since reunification that have allowed it to take a more dominant leadership 
position within the European Union. According to Wendler 2017, German reunification and 
European integration became so semantically related they were almost inseparable, showing the 
Federal Republic’s focus on the future of the European Union and the new role Germany plays in 
it. Angela Merkel has stated that “The Cold War is over. The whole continent can live according 
to the European idea today. [. . .] Europe needs to find intrinsic reasons for its existence and has 
to demonstrate that it can shape politics according to its own values in a world of increased 
competition and global transparency" (Wendler 2017, 579). For Germany, the recent past has 
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dictated economic and social policy in relation to how the country interacts with the EU; 
however, the focus should be on building a sustainable and self-reliant future that addresses the 
unique challenges of the EU’s common market, security policies, and welfare state. 
Germany’s Standing in the European Union 
 
Germany increasingly gained power and standing throughout the European Union after 
World War II by successfully establishing itself as a western ally, becoming a strong export 
economy, and having European-focused policies. There are several positions on Germany’s 
standing in the EU, ranging from hegemony to normal nation state. The “German Europe” thesis 
considers Germany as the hegemon of Europe as a consequence of the global economic crisis of 
2008 (Bruno and Finzi 2018, 51). Because of the asymmetric impact of the Eurozone crisis on 
southern Europe, scholars posit that Germany was able to become an unrivaled economic 
hegemony over the region due to its size and economic importance. The “Semi-hegemony” 
theory suggests that Germany’s ordoliberal politics and culture of stability have led the country 
to push for austerity in the region. Scholars who argue Germany is “Normal” cite the countries 
occupation after World War II stagnated its economic growth and the Eurozone crisis and the 
larger Global Economic Crisis returned the Federal Republic to normality by pursuing its own 
national interests like other fully sovereign nations (ibid, 52). Overall, Germany has contributed 
€25.267 billion to the European Union’s budget in 2018 while the EU spent €12.054 billion in 
Germany. The country’s real GDP in the third quarter of 2020 was 8.5 compared to 0.2, the 
average among the rest of the EU member states. Unemployment (based on the International 
Labor Offices definition) was 4.5 percent compared to 6.1 percent, the average among the rest of 
the EU member states in 2020 (“Germany” 2018). These are just some indicators of Germany’s 
standing compared to other EU member states and should be understood in context.  
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The regional power Germany has gained since the 2008 economic crisis, due in part to its 
culture of order and stability, avoidance of military intervention, and the struggle to come-to-
terms with national socialism, but also due to Merkel's leadership in times of crisis when 
multilateral leadership was not available, has afforded Germany with unintentional power over 
the region (Bruno and Finzi 2018, 53). Bruno and Finzi state that regional powers bear a special 
responsibility for regional security and order, and Germany’s culture of stability and its leader’s 
rhetorical commitment to a strong EU not only show its influence over the region but also the 
commitment to European success. Germany’s own constitution, the Basic Law or Grundgesestz, 
as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, has norms framing German EU policy and constraints 
on executive autonomy in European decision-making (Wendler 2017, 576). The federal 
parliament, the Bundestag, debates on European affairs to ensure limits on EU integration and 
national sovereignty. These constraints have become important during times of crisis when 
supranational integration and national sovereignty have been blurred in order to push policy 
forward at the supranational level. 
 Angela Merkel  
 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has had an important role in establishing Germany as a leader 
in the European Union. Merkel took office in 2005 and established herself as a leader not only of 
Germany but of the EU by emphasizing international cooperation and stability. In 2008, Merkel 
used Germany's historical experience with European integration and reunification for the basis of 
her  narrative on addressing the euro crisis. However, her national fiscal plan of austerity did not 
address the Eurozone’s weaknesses but rather emphasized the importance for defending the 
common currency in order to maintain the stability of the European project (Hertner Miskommen 
2015, 49). Not only was Merkel a key negotiator in the 2008 European Economic Recovery Plan, 
 47 
but Germany also increased its contribution to bailouts in 2011 and 2012 to emphasize the 
necessity to reform economies in line with EU policies. Merkel’s commitment to Germany’s 
position in the EU also encompasses migration policy, which she has prioritized throughout her 
time as chancellor. She convened the first National Integration plan in 2006, expanding it in 
2012, and introduced widespread reform in 2013. In 2015 she kept the borders open to refugees 
coming from Hungary, resulting in an outpouring of citizen engagement and “welcome culture” 
(Mushaben 2017). 
Along with taking decisive action within Germany, Merkel took a leading role on EU 
policy negotiating the EU-Turkey Agreement. The agreement included the return to Turkey of 
each irregular migrant arriving on Greek islands after the 20 March, 2016 and the resettlement of 
one Syrian refugee from Turkey to the EU for each Syrian being returned from Greece to 
Turkey, known as the 1:1 mechanism. The agreement also discussed enhanced preventative 
measures Turkey needed to take in order to stop new sea or land routes for irregular migration to 
Europe through Turkey, as well as providing an additional 3 billion euros towards the Refugee 
Facility for Turkey and improvement of humanitarian conditions in Syria. Additionally, the EU-
Turkey deal reaccelerated the visa liberalization procedure of Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations, focusing on financial and budgetary provisions (Reiners and Tekin 2020). 
However, since Merkel’s humanitarian policy to keep borders open, she has faced public 
and political backlash. In March 2016, the Alternative for Germany won 11.7 percent of the vote 
in Rhineland-Pfalz, 14.9 percent in Baden-Württemberg, and 24 percent in Sachsen-Anhalt. 
Merkel also faced an electoral blow in her home state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the 
AfD garnered 20.8 percent of the vote in 2016. In 2018, Merkel had to concede on an open-door 
refugee policy to maintain her coalition government, agreeing to set up transit centers for asylum 
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seekers to stay in before they were approved for legal entry. This caused backlash from the Left 
and the public, who were advocating for asylum seekers human rights and Germany’s moral and 
humanitarian mission (Petzinger 2018). 
 Merkel announced in October 2018 that she would be stepping down as the head of the 
Christian Democratic Union and would not seek re-election as chancellor. The CDU/CSU party 
and coalition government have been afflicted with infighting, causing delays in appointing a new 
head of the party. However, since the COVID-19 pandemic has ravaged Europe, Merkel has 
regained favorability with approval ratings as high as 86 percent within Germany (Morris 2020). 
Holding the seat of EU presidency from July 2020 to December 2020, Merkel has focused on 
strengthening the European Union. Known as the “austerity chancellor” from her policies during 
the euro crisis, Merkel has flipped positions during this crisis and joined French President 
Emmanuel Macron in promoting a plan that would collectivize EU debt and help the countries 
hit hardest by the pandemic through a combination of grants and loans. Merkel’s commitment 
not only to Germany’s success but Europe’s success can be seen in her evolving policy decisions 











Findings: The Nation State as Supranational Actor  
 
My study examines 27 press conferences, press statements, and government statements 
that address the Eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis which span from 
2010 to 2020. While hundreds of press conferences, press statements, and government policy 
statements concern domestic, European, and foreign policy, I argue that this sample provides 
significant insight into how Chancellor Angela Merkel and other political figures portrayed and 
handled each crisis. Within my exploration of how German leadership handled each crisis, I also 
focus on how these crises complicate the larger project of European identity, mobility, and 
governance. In this section I will discuss my findings.  
 Analysis of coded qualitative data revealed dominant themes of economic stability and 
growth, unity and cooperation among Member States, and bordering as a process to secure both 
the nation state and Europe. These themes appeared throughout each crisis and across time 
frames in various densities. While using discourse analysis to analyze these themes, it is 
important to remember that these crises were and are dynamic in nature. Each theme informs the 
other in important and dramatic ways, especially during crisis situations. By dividing up the 
discussion into themes, I hope to illuminate the myriad of processes occurring throughout Europe 
during the “decade of crisis” to better understand how crises has complicated our understanding 
of Europe.  
Crisis in Context 
 
 Each crisis is complex and continues to influence European integration, policy, and 
identity in dynamic ways. To help conceptualize how German leaders spoke about these dynamic 
processes over time, I created word clouds which visualize word frequencies. I used a five word 
minimum for the 1,000 most frequent words to create each figure. 
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 Figure 1 
Eurozone Crisis, Word Frequency 
Figure 2 
Migrant Crisis, Word Frequency 
Figure 3 













Europe or European 114 
Crisis  47 
Economic  32 







Europe or European 67 
States 27 
Refugees  24 
Federal  23 






People  24 
Germany  22 
Europe  21 
Federal  19 
Measures 17 
 
I used this data visualization technique to help connect themes across crises and across 
national and European scales. Each word frequency cloud showed keywords to identify the core 
of each crisis like “economic,” “refugee,” and “health,” although these offered fewer insights 
into cross-crisis themes. Most profound is the centrality of Europe in German leaders discourse 
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during both the Eurozone crisis and the migrant crisis. There is a shift during the COVID-19 
crisis from a supranational perspective to a domestic one, focusing on the citizens of Germany. 
The shift from and supranational to a domestic framework broadly shows the nature of each 
crisis and how the German government shifted from dealing with international organizations to 
directly addressing citizens. The Eurozone and migrant crisis overwhelmingly exposed 
institutional problems in the eyes of German leadership and therefore were dealt with by 
addressing Europe as a whole. The COVID-19 pandemic, however global in reach, directly is 
impacting each citizen on a daily basis, so the German government's discourse shifted to address 
the needs of the people. 
Shifting from European institutional discourse to the German citizenry not only shows 
the nature of each crisis, but also shows the way in which governments are dependent on citizens 
to mitigate crises. This became evident in the COVID-19 pandemic when government policies 
were reliant on citizen cooperation unlike at any stage during the other crises. 
“Germany has met the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic thanks to the 
committed cooperation of all social actors and, above all, the citizens, which has 
been well managed in the past few months.” - August 27, 2020; Government 
Statement 
“I think it is particularly important that we have actually addressed precisely those 
areas in which there are no controlled and controllable procedures. In the 
workplace, in public transport, in schools, in caterers, in retail and in many areas of 
public life, we see that the rules that we have decided together are implemented 
well, that they are accepted and supported by the citizens and that they are also easy 
to control.” -Michael Müller, October 14, 2020; Press Conference  
The Eurozone crisis mainly dictated national spending, debt thresholds, and also restructured 
international loans and bank levies. The migrant crisis reframed European societies, both the 
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faces within them and their approaches to migration policy. Communities were called on to 
support national efforts to house and integrate refugees into society, but policy was nationally 
and (sometimes) supranationally focused. The coronavirus pandemic shifted this trend, as 
government policy and community compliance became explicitly linked with crisis management 
success. Leaders had to shift their discourse and appeal to a wider base, reach compromises 
across party lines, and inspire and empathize with citizens all while tackling an unknown threat. 
While all leaders around the world faced this challenge, German leadership was praised at the 
onset of the pandemic for its decisive action and cooperation in containing the spread in Europe. 
However, as summer turned to fall, the leading coalition of the Christian Democratic Union and 
the Social Democratic Party began to falter as Merkel’s time as chancellor began to wind down. 
German Leadership  
 
 Angela Merkel has led Germany for 18 years and has steered the country through the 
global financial crisis, the Eurozone debt crisis, the migrant crisis, the COVID-19 crisis, as well 
as other acute crises. Merkel stepped down as chair of her party, the CDU, in 2018 but finding a 
successor has been a challenge. While not without her critics, Merkel’s crisis management skills 
have been forefront in discourse not only in facilitating compromise among German ministers 
but also in building consensus among EU partners.   
 International organization leaders, German minister presidents, and others have discussed 
Merkel’s leadership in times of crisis as pragmatic, diplomatic, and even at times, boring. With 
Germany’s history of national socialism, charismatic leaders are unwelcome, and Merkel’s 
rational voice through crisis has been applauded against the background of other world leaders 
(like Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Silvio Berlusconi). Over time, Merkel’s leadership has 
been, if anything, steady. 
 54 
“The Chancellor is a good leader; this has been raised several times today, and it is 
true.” - Juan Somavia, 28 April 2010; Press Conference  
“In any case, Germany was and is not without leadership today. At the moment, 
that is the most important thing.” - Markus Söder, October 28, 2020; Press 
Conference 
Although the context in which Merkel led Germany between the Eurozone crisis and the 
COVID-19 crisis vary greatly, the sentiment of stability and belief in her ability to unite 
Germany remains. At the same time as leaders are praising Merkel for collaborating 
across party lines as well as with international actors, public opinion and the media have 
challenged that perception. Many policies Merkel has pursued have been politically 
turbulent and caused public backlash from German and European citizens.   
“Your critics keep accusing you of having no passion or vision for Europe. What 
do you think of them?” - Question, July 22, 2011; Press Conference 
“Especially at the election campaign events in East Germany, you can always hear 
this ‘Merkel has to go.’ That is based on that 89 call ‘The wall must go.’ Can you 
explain why you, as the East German Chancellor, have your bitterest and loudest 
critics in the East, how close such situations are to you and to what extent they 
affect you?” - Question, August 29, 2017; Press Conference 
Merkel’s fluctuating public perception has challenged her ability to be the face of 
European integration, especially as calls of her commitment to Europe (especially in the 
deindustrialized Eastern areas) was called into question. These criticisms notably come in 
the form of questions from journalists present at press conferences and not from other 
international or national leaders. Popular opinion and elite opinion differ and seem to be 
held to a different standard, specifically in addressing crises. 
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 Economic Power and Privilege  
 
 By far the most dominant topic among German leadership across time and crisis was the 
economy. The German economy was not the sole focus, but the Eurozone (which includes the 19 
countries using the euro) and the wider 27 Member States of the European Union were also 
discussed. Economic stability, growth, and recovery were topics of concern. The policies 
implemented during the Eurozone crisis —- between 2010 and 2013 —- have impacted 
European financial policy, economic power, and privilege in subsequent crises, affecting how 
Germany has been perceived as a European economic leader. 
 Angela Merkel, her government, and international coalitions perpetuated policies that 
privileged the Eurozone as well as Germany’s own standing under the slogan “if the euro fails, 
Europe fails.” I found that during the Eurozone crisis, German leaders tried to quell the 
resentment building between the Eurozone members and the larger European Union. 
“The problem is that Europe consists of an Eurogroup of 17 countries and the 27 
member states. The 17 can work together more closely, but parliamentary control 
is always geared towards the 27, i.e., the European Parliament. The Commission is 
always the Commission of 27. If there are countries like Great Britain that say, ‘As 
far as we can see, never the euro’, we have to talk in principle about what that 
actually means for integration options on the same contractual basis.” - Angela 
Merkel, July 22, 2011; Press Conference 
“In the meantime, however, we are experiencing a phase of social crisis that 
includes keywords such as unemployment among young people, resentment against 
Germany and rejection of Europe. The key political question must be: Can we bear 
this?” - Angela Merkel, May 16, 2013; Press Conference  
In 2011, Merkel attempted to address the disunity arising between non-euro and euro Member 
States, but increasingly stuck by Germany’s commitment to saving the euro no matter the cost. 
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This resulted in dramatic social and political backlash. Germany’s own critique and positioning 
of a European social crisis at the “end” of the euro crisis in 2013 shows the German government 
reckoning with the political backlash from the imposition of strict austerity measures, both 
domestically and internationally. Merkel delicately tries to balance the power disparities between 
the Eurozone and the European Parliament. The rift between financial and legislative power 
points to larger institutional disintegration at the supranational level, because economic stability 
seemed to supersede other political priorities.  
In connecting the success of the euro to the success of Europe, German leadership firmly 
positioned itself in ordoliberal and austerity policies. I found that Merkel shifted from harsh, 
decisive action to more empathetic and cooperative economic policy over time and crisis. This is 
most likely due to the nature of each crisis, as the Eurozone crisis did not impact Germany as 
hard or for as long as other countries such as Greece, whereas Germany was more directly 
impacted by the migrant crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. German leadership has also been under 
scrutiny since they pushed through austerity measures during the Eurozone crisis. The German 
government has been self-critical and has moved to change European policies to better address 
future crises. This was shown repeatedly by Merkel and other German officials framing the 
importance of coordinated economic policy.  
“Because only if we are economically in good shape will we be able to cope with 
the pressing challenges of our time in the future” - Angela Merkel, March 16, 2016; 
Government Address  
“We are determined to spare no effort, either individually or collectively, when it 
comes to protecting lives, securing jobs and income, restoring trust, maintaining 
financial stability, revitalizing growth and emerging stronger from the crisis, to 
minimize disruptions in trade and global supply chains, to provide support to all 
 57 
countries in need, and to coordinate public health and financial measures” - Angela 
Merkel, March 26, 2020; Government Address 
Mentioning economic policy and stability during the migrant and COVID-19 crisis shows the 
failings of European policy changes during the Eurozone crisis to mitigate future debt and 
liquidity problems as well as the constant need for economic coordination in the EU. While the 
European Union is fundamentally a political and economic union, suggesting coordinated 
economic policy at its core, this call for cooperation throughout crises not only shows the 
disintegration of national fiscal policies but also the failure of past crises to adequately address 
future ones. 
Unity and Cooperation  
 
 Another major theme was the need for unity and cooperation. While unity should be an 
obvious component of the European Union, there is a lack of coordination across the bloc in 
economic, migration, and health policies which have not only resulted in the unequal distribution 
of burden in times of crisis but have also resulted in certain nation states having more power than 
European institutions in enacting policy solutions.  
In press conferences, specifically with other national leaders, I found that even though 
leaders were calling for European unity, they were still placing nations at the forefront of 
decision-making.  
“Angela, I would like to thank you very much for what you personally have done 
to create a common, new European architecture that will allow us to cope with these 
new challenges we are facing. Thank you for your support, for your friendship and 
for the hospitality that I always experience here.” - Georgios Papandreou, February 
22, 2011; Press Statement  
“The nation states are the masters of the treaties or the ladies of the treaties - it 
doesn't matter. The state is the master. If you commit to representative democracy, 
 58 
the competencies are transferred through the democratically elected institutions. At 
the moment, for example, when I give the European Commission the power of 
attorney according to the motto "You have the competence to negotiate free trade 
agreements for me" - I still have to ratify that nationally - I have of course given up 
some of my competence. But then the European Parliament is again the democratic 
controller, and there are Austrians in it again. In other words, if you then feel that 
you are not being given sufficient attention, you are basically not committed to 
Europe” - Angela Merkel, May 16, 2013; Press Conference  
“You are now an experienced crisis manager during the financial crisis. What 
conclusions do you draw from this for your current work? Where do you see 
similarities and where do you see differences?”- Question, March 11, 2020; Press 
Conference  
Germany has been both idealized and vilified for its position as crisis manager. Scholars take 
different stances on Germany’s position as an economic hegemon of Europe, due to its size and 
economic importance. A common trend shown in my data is that Germany has become a “Semi-
Hegemony” as leaders forcefully assert economic policy while still trying to promote European 
unity. Germany’s unique historical context cannot be discounted here, as its reunification process 
is intimately tied to the success of the European Union. This has caused German leaders both to 
assert more dominance in policy decisions, but also still have Europe at the center of policy 
decisions, at least rhetorically. The juxtaposition between upholding the power of the nation state 
while still emphasizing commitment to stronger EU institutions to address EU crises shows the 
disconnect in national and supranational power, a main focus of Eurosceptics and right-wing 
populists.  
“These AfD people also exist in the old federal states, but they are particularly 
dominant in the new federal states; that's true. But I believe that it is right to face it. 
Thank God there are always very many who think differently. I am very happy 
about that.” - Angela Merkel, August 29, 2017; Press Conference 
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“But finances will not be the only topic in our Council Presidency; it is also about 
migration, the rule of law and, of course, above all two major tasks which will lead 
us into the future’ -Angela Merkel, July 8, 2020; Press Statement 
The right-wing populist movements that have been growing in strength since 2010 were hardly 
spoken of and rarely directly named. Not directly addressing right-wing populist groups aids the 
narrative of a unified Europe but minimizes the strength these movements have accumulated, 
many since 2010. The leading coalition consists of mainstream, center-right and center-left 
parties that have been losing favor among voters, in many parts because of citizens 
disenfranchisement from crisis management strategies. Referring to right-wing populist parties 
and building Euroscepticism as issues concerning “rule of law,” German leaders evade facing 
questions of racism, xenophobia, and extremism head on in government statements and press 
statements. This surprised me because there is usually a zero-tolerance attitude toward extremist 
ideology in Germany due to the history of national socialism. Nevertheless, only when directly 
asked by a reporter who mentioned the AfD did Merkel also address the right-wing populist 
party by name. In references to other countries and broader EU agendas, leaders would always 
refer to rising Euroscepticism and right-wing populism as “the rule of law.” 
 Unity and skepticism has been balanced in Europe since its foundation, yet the persistent 
crises and power imbalances between individual Member States and European institutions have 
created greater fractions. Discourse placing nations at the forefront was contrasted with intense 
calls for coordination.  
“We also have to establish globally coordinated rules so that we can restructure or 
wind down systemically relevant financial institutions across borders in the event 
of a crisis, in a way that is kind to the financial market and, if possible, without 
burdening taxpayers.” - 27 October 2010; Government Address 
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“Germans and Europeans paid a high price because it would become obvious that 
previous measures were only sham solutions that only addressed the symptoms of 
the crisis, but not the causes” - 16 March 2016; Government Address 
“In order to secure our future, we are committed to strengthening national, regional 
and global capabilities to respond to potential infectious disease outbreaks by 
substantially increasing our spending on epidemic prevention.” -March 26, 2020; 
Government Address 
Throughout the decade, systematic change for financial, border, and healthcare policies were 
called for in order to secure a stabler future. Throughout this call for unity, we must ask who this 
better future is being made for and who is being left behind.  
Bordering and Rebordering  
 
 Borders in the European Union have been challenged during crises. During crises the 
European Commission has amended the Schengen Border Code to address the new challenges 
that face both the internal and external borders. It is important to remember power dynamics that 
play into the bordering process, which in international law give individual nation states the 
power to determine who gets to cross their borders and who does not. The EU has attempted to 
rescale state borders for a homogenous internal border. Yet, in times of crisis, the nation state 
still wields ultimate power and has securitized its border and deter entrance. Meanwhile, the EU 
as a supra state organization maintains a colonial external border policy in outsourcing border 
policing and offloading true migration reform on third party countries.  
I found the free movement of European citizens was emphasized most during the 
Eurozone crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. During the Eurozone crisis, emphasis was put on 
mobility in order for citizens to find jobs and maintain trade while border policy during the 
COVID-19 pandemic calls on citizens to avoid unnecessary travel to slow the spread of the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus to preserve national healthcare capacities. The discourse used around these 
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border policies is decisively citizen focused for the financial stability as well as physical well-
being of individuals. 
“Second, we need to increase mobility in Europe. In Germany we only managed to 
achieve German unity by reducing youth unemployment because the young people 
from my constituency on the Baltic coast are now in Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg.” -Angela Merkel, 16 May 2013; Press Conference  
“We call on citizens to refrain from private trips and visits from relatives, if these 
trips are not absolutely necessary. This also applies to tourist and day-trip trips and 
trips. Accommodation offers in Germany are only made available for necessary and 
expressly non-tourist purposes.” -Angela Merkel, October 28, 2020; Press 
Conference  
Border policies centering the citizen emphasizes the European Union’s commitment to 
free movement. As one of the main ways to activate European citizenship, upholding the right to 
mobility is paramount, even in times of crisis. Leaders have used a citizen-centric approach to 
quell unrest and fear of encroachment on freedoms. However, there have been increasing use of 
temporary border restrictions, especially with an influx of migrants and increase in terrorist 





Time Frame  
 
Temporary Reintroduction of Border Controls1 
 
Austria  
(February 28 – March 29, 2021) COVID-19; borders with the Slovak Republic and the 
Czech Republic 
(November 12, 2020 – May 11, 2021) Secondary movements, risk related to terrorists and 
organized crime, situation at the external borders; 
land borders with Hungary and with Slovenia 
 
1“Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission. Accessed 
March 4, 2021. 
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Belgium (February 26 – March 17, 2021) COVID-19; all internal border 
Denmark (November 12, 2020 – May 11, 2021)  COVID-19; to be determined but may concern all 
internal borders; 
(November 12, 2020 – May 11, 2021)  Terrorist threats, organized criminality threats; to be 
determined but may concern all internal borders 
Finland  (February 22 – March 18, 20201) COVID-19; all internal border except border with 
Iceland 
France (November 1 2020 – April 30, 2021 Continuous terrorist threat, situation at external 
borders; all internal borders 
Germany  (March 4 – March 17, 2021) 
 
COVID-19; land and air border with the Czech 
Republic, air border with Austria 
(November 12, 2020 – May 11, 2021) Secondary movements, situation at the external 
borders; land border with Austria 
Hungary (February 28 – March 15, 2021) COVID-19; all internal borders 
Norway (February 10 – March 12, 2021) COVID-19; all internal borders 
(November 12, 2020 – May 11, 2021) Terrorist threats, secondary movements; ports with 
ferry connections to Denmark, Germany and Sweden 
Portugal (March 2, – March 16, 2021) COVID-19; internal border with Spain 
Spain  (March 1 – March 16, 2021) COVID-19; land border with Portugal 
Sweden (November 12, 2020 – May 11, 2021) 
 
Terrorist threats, shortcomings at the external borders; 
to be determined but may concern all internal borders 
 
These temporary border controls are reintroduced on the prerogative of the Member State and 
while the Commission may issue an opinion regarding the measure, it cannot veto the decision. 
There are time limits between 10 days to until “the threat has dissipated,” giving Member States 
immense power over sealing borders, dictating what situations necessitate border controls, and 
who is allowed to pass through national borders.  
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 Again, the question of national versus European power comes into question. Member 
States wield so much power in the bordering process they are weary to reform European 
migration policy. Unlike economic policy which has marked benefits for nation states —lower 
unemployment rates, lower debt ratios, etc.— comprehensive and coordinated migration policy 
does not have the same incentive. While leaders might campaign and promise coordinated EU 
migration policy, nation states maintain more power when they have the ability to dictate 
migration policy at the national level. German leaders have claimed to want a fair distribution of 
refugees among Member States and an overhaul of the Dublin procedure, yet still implemented 
temporary border controls in 2016 to manage internal migration.  
 The type of crisis situation is also important when it comes to implementing border 
controls. As stated earlier, during the Eurozone crisis and COVID-19 crisis, leaders used citizen-
forward discourse when talking about mobility and border policy. There was a clear difference in 
tone from the migrant crisis to the COVID-19 crisis regarding the necessity of border closures.   
“How sure are you that border controls will still take place at the German external 
borders after November? As the situation is at the moment, I think we need these 
border controls.” - Question and answer from Angela Merkel, August 29, 2017; 
Press Conference 
“Incidentally, closing the borders across the board does not prevent what happens 
there. It is in the country, and the moment you reduce border measures again, it 
starts again. I understand that at the moment there is a special situation on the 
northern Italian border, and I understand that you will then come to temporary 
checks there. But that is something different from fundamental border measures” - 
Angela Merkel, March 11, 2020;  Press Conference 
These two different expressions of border control show the power of bordering. During 
the migrant crisis there was fear of “the Other” in the form of asylum seekers flooding 
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into Germany and overwhelming the country. During the COVID-19 pandemic Germans 
as well as other Europeans were the carriers of a deadly virus that has been 
overwhelming the entire world. The different frames in which border closures occurred 
— one to stop Black and Brown Muslim asylum seekers from claiming refugee and one 
to discourage unnecessary leisure travel — emphasizes the power disparity in mobility, 
bordering, and national migration agendas.  
These themes put into perspective the complicated relationships between the 
nation state and European institutions as actors during crises. The government statements, 
press statements, and press conferences point to the disconnect between national and 

















My data provides evidence that crises have impacted how the European project is framed 
from a German political perspective. Discourse used by German leadership provides examples of 
how European institutional power and European identity have shifted in the last decade and that 
citizens are more crucial than ever to the success of crisis management policies and broader 
integrative measures.  
All three crises analyzed came under pressure from exogenous shocks which showed 
major endogenous flaws in European integration. In the Eurozone crisis, nation states preserved 
the euro and agreed on the creation of a permanent rescue fund, the banking union, and enhanced 
macroeconomic and budgetary supervision of the Member States (Schimmelfennig 2018, 970). 
This was seen as an increase in European integration efforts. During the migrant crisis, Member 
States maintained control of borders and failed to agree on substantial integration progress (i.e., 
reforming the Dublin Agreement). Currently in the COVID-19 crisis, there are on-going 
coordination problems with border control measures, travel restrictions, vaccine distribution, and 
strengthening health systems across the EU (which will be discussed further in the conclusion).  
Main theories on European integration include neofunctionalism, postfunctionalism, and 
intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalism emphasizes how path-dependency and spillovers result 
in more integration. Postfunctionalist theory emphasizes that due to imbalances caused by crisis, 
there is backlash which is driven by mass politicization and results in less integration 
(Schimmelfennig 2018, 972). Liberal intergovernmentalism theorizes European integration as a 
process of inter-state bargaining in which governments are chiefly motivated by economic 
preferences (Hooghe and Marks 2019). The future of European integration is more contingent 
than these theoretical approaches suggest. Therefore, I propose a hegemonic-stability theoretical 
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approach to explain how European integration has been impacted by the three crises I have set 
forth. Hegemonic-stability theory contends that Germany’s economic and political position in the 
EU gives it a semi-hegemonic status in the EU which drives integration efforts, but the recent 
increase in nationalism throughout the Federal Republic as well as across the EU is challenging 
the incentive for pro-European policies. While Germany has had pro-integrationist policies and 
has strong economic and political incentives in the maintenance of a politically and economically 
stable European Union, domestic politics of Member States have increasingly become adversary 
to European integration (Webber 2014, 354). Stability of the European Union is interwoven with 
German success and is why German leadership puts such a large focus on supra-state policies. 
About 60 percent of Germany’s trade is with other EU countries. Additionally, Germany’s 
historical role in the region and its central position on the continent requires it to avoid 
diplomatic isolation. While Germany has constantly called for unity — in both social and 
economic policy — this stance has come under duress in times of crisis. 
My data show German political discourse centralizing around economic growth and 
stability as well as broad European cooperation and the promotion of a united European 
citizenry. The discourse used during the Eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis, and the COVID-19 
crisis each reframe “Europe,” impacting integration efforts. Similarly, the emphasis on economic 
well-being in contrast to other sectors of the Union, namely mobility and healthcare capacity, 
show how national interests influence EU policy coordination and integration efforts. Germany’s 
unique historical context cannot be discounted here, as its reunification process is intimately tied 
to the success of the European Union. The juxtaposition between upholding the power of the 
nation state while still emphasizing commitment to stronger EU institutions to address EU crises 
shows the disconnect in national and supranational power. Lack of coordination across the bloc 
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in economic, migration, and health policies have not only resulted in the unequal distribution of 
burden in times of crisis but have also resulted in certain nation states having more power than 
European institutions in enacting policy solutions.  
“Europe” itself and how it relates to Germany has been complicated during times of 
crisis, as Germany has become an efficient driver of policy change at the European level 
threatening the supra-state–nation state power balance. German leadership’s discourse has been 
focused on unity (Einheit) and integration (Einigung) since German reunification in 1990 
(Wendler 2017, 574). During the Eurozone crisis, German political discourse focused on 
European cohesion, Germany’s dependency on the European Union for success, and on future 
growth and stability. However, there was this dichotomy between needing cohesive EU financial 
policy (which was in some ways achieved) and implementing austerity measures that enhanced 
Germany’s economic power in the region. As set out in my findings, the economy was the most 
prevalent theme in German discourse, and the policies established during the Eurozone crisis 
impacted future crisis management strategies. Importantly, Angela Merkel, her government, and 
international coalitions perpetuated policies that privileged the Eurozone as well as Germany’s 
own standing under the slogan “if the euro fails, Europe fails.” Europe was seen both as 
inseparable from German economic success but also dependent on Germany, emphasizing the 
power of nation states within the supra-state organization. In 2011, Merkel attempted to address 
the disunity arising between non-euro and euro Member States, but increasingly stuck by 
Germany’s commitment to saving the euro no matter the cost. Since the Eurozone crisis, German 
leadership has also been under scrutiny for the harsh austerity measures and has moved to 
change European policies to better address future crises.  
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“Because only if we are economically in good shape will we be able to cope with 
the pressing challenges of our time in the future” - Angela Merkel, March 16, 2016; 
Government Address  
 
The dominance of economic stability in German political discourse, especially during the 
Eurozone and migrant crisis, shows that Germany still had strong economic and political 
incentives in the maintenance of a politically and economically stable Europe, like the 
hegemonic stability suggests. Economic influence over austerity measures and focus on stability 
comes in stark contrast to the institutional powers of the European Union. Germany was able to 
wield economic power and in turn provide stability for the region, especially during the 
Eurozone crisis. Discourse around economic stability was connected to the call for unity found in 
the data, showing that at this time Germany was still committed to integrationist policies. 
The Eurozone crisis shaped European institutional power, expanding the executive 
branch’s power (the EU Commission) while constraining the legislative branch’s power (the EU 
Parliament), emboldening discourse among the radical right and Eurosceptic movements which 
tout the EU as an unrepresentative and undemocratic supranational structure (Lemke 2014, 19). 
This legitimacy crisis of the EU is reflected in German political discourse, which privileged 
European Economic Area members over the EU 27 members. This sentiment follows the 
German narrative of “if the euro fails, Europe fails,” which is why German leaders privilege 
policies that benefit the euro’s standing perhaps over policies that would benefit the entirety of 
the EU. The hegemonic-stability theory suggests that “the overwhelming dominance of one 
country is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition” for the maintenance of a stable region 
economy (Webber 2014, 356). Germany, France, and the UK have been the dominant powers in 
Europe in the 20th and 21st century, but Germany has slowly become the overwhelming driver 
of policy initiatives. Since the Eurozone crisis, there have been increasingly asymmetrical 
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relationships between Berlin, London, and Paris, especially because of the UK’s final departure 
from the Union in 2021 and France’s increasingly junior partnership with Germany on financial 
integration. While discourse shows that German political leaders were trying to toe the line 
between crisis manager and EU cheerleader, the policies Merkel pushed forward divided the 
Union into winners and losers. Stronger economies dominated policy negotiations and recovered 
more quickly from the Eurozone crisis while weaker economies continued to struggle with 
austerity measures causing high unemployment rates for years after the “end” of the crisis in 
2013. Large portions of EU citizenry lost faith in the institutions that were meant to unite and 
protect the rights of the political and economic union. While the European Union is 
fundamentally a political and economic union, suggesting coordinated economic policy at its 
core, this call for cooperation throughout crises not only shows the disintegration of national 
fiscal policies but also the failure of past crises to adequately address future ones.  
 Countries that were hit hardest by the Eurozone crisis is also where migrants came in the 
biggest waves. Again, legitimacy of the EU came into question as the migrant crisis was not 
handled in accordance with adopted legislation but instead defaulted to individual nation states 
which had different border restrictions, asylum policies, and traditions pertaining to the rule of 
law (Nedergaard 2019, 82). Member States like Italy, Greece, and Spain were seeing a huge 
influx of asylum seekers due to their geographical location on the Mediterranean Sea, yet 
countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were driving policy initiatives due to 
their economic standing, creating a disjointed EU response to the migrant crisis. My data show a 
clear shift in discourse surrounding borders and travel restrictions between the migrant crisis and 
the COVID-19 crisis, emphasizing the power Member States have in the bordering process. 
Border securitization to protect “Europe” was framed by German leaders as requiring a pan-
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European solution, yet Member States institutionally hold the power to reinstate border 
restrictions, citing security threats and needing to better mitigate migration flows. German 
leadership, while calling for an overhaul of existing systems to combat the migrant crisis, was 
instating border controls and had discourse that implied indignation at countries that did not want 
to participate in redistributive mechanisms. Unlike in the Eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis 
showed how reliant Germany was on other Member States for cooperation in implementing 
comprehensive reform of treaties. Because of Germany’s liberal policies at the onset of the 
migrant crisis and the resulting political and public backlash, leaders were determined to 
establish and push forward an EU agenda that emphasized burden sharing and a more integrative 
approach to migration and border controls.  
Many EU countries have reinstated temporary border restrictions and travel bans 
throughout the on-going COVID-19 pandemic to preserve healthcare capacity and stop the 
spread of the novel coronavirus. For the first time in its history, the European Union closed all its 
external borders to prevent the spread of the virus on March 17, 2020 with Member States 
imposing national border restrictions as well (Linka et al. 2020, 710). German politicians have 
claimed border closures are not the way to mitigate the COVID-19 crisis yet currently have 
border controls with Austria and France. The current system of Schengen cooperation (or lack 
thereof) has serious challenges for the institution’s legitimacy because there are staggering 
differences between participating countries beliefs about compliance with statutory rules 
(Nedergaard 2019, 83). This variance in compliance was evident during the migrant crisis as 
individual nation states dictated border controls and not EU institutions, creating a nationalistic 
sense of borders, integration, and acceptance of migrants. The type of crisis situation is also 
important when it comes to implementing border controls. My data show that during the 
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Eurozone crisis and COVID-19 crisis, leaders used citizen-forward discourse when talking about 
mobility and border policy. There was a clear difference in tone from the migrant crisis to the 
COVID-19 crisis regarding the necessity of border closures.   
“How sure are you that border controls will still take place at the German external 
borders after November? As the situation is at the moment, I think we need these 
border controls.” - Question and answer from Angela Merkel, August 29, 2017; 
Press Conference 
“Incidentally, closing the borders across the board does not prevent what happens 
there. It is in the country, and the moment you reduce border measures again, it 
starts again. I understand that at the moment there is a special situation on the 
northern Italian border, and I understand that you will then come to temporary 
checks there. But that is something different from fundamental border measures” - 
Angela Merkel, March 11, 2020;  Press Conference 
These two different expressions of border control show the power of bordering and how 
the nation state is able to wield its power in a crisis situation. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has exacerbated this nationalism at borders in times of crisis. While there is institutional 
rhetoric and material symbols of an integrated, networked Europe, social boundaries still 
dominate border zones (Opiłowska 2021, 592). Persistence of mental and language 
barriers, cultural differences and historical trauma maintain national divides in the EU 
and is why, especially during crisis, leaders invoke border control. The ability for nation 
states to dictate border closures and controls and the unwillingness for Member States to 
cooperate on integrative measures emphasize how crises have caused mass politicization 
across the EU, and nation states seek to protect national identity and domestic interests 
over European integration efforts.  
The imposition of border controls are perceived by nation states as providing security in 
times of crisis, yet as we have seen during the coronavirus pandemic, they are permeable and 
insufficient at stopping threats. As mechanisms of state control, border restrictions in the EU 
show the uncoordinated policies between the institution and nation states. However, the 
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disruption border restrictions have caused at the local level show an alternative to disintegration, 
one of “how interconnected European border regions already are and how transnational border 
spaces have become” (Opiłowska 2021, 597). European border regions, officially called 
European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, or Euroregions, were one solution to enhance 
cross-border relations and mitigate the aforementioned social boundaries that hampered 
international integration. These Euroregions have played historic roles in maintaining mobility 
across European borders but have been underfunded and under-supported due to crises facing the 
Union. Different cultures, languages, and customs required nation states and the EU to work 
together and provide public services to foster a strong sense of community, but “bordering 
practices … allow certain expressions of identity and collective memory to exist while blocking 
others” (Paasi 2014, 9). While Euroregions have been places encouraged to integrate across 
nations, cultures, and languages, events like the migrant crisis and the COVID-19 crisis have 
raised a question about how borders are actually drawn, where they are, and who gets to cross 
them.  
The migrant and COVID-19 crises have altered how citizens view their relationship to 
movement, in part due to reinstated border controls, but also due to politicians’ discourse 
emphasizing threats posed by others and the need for solidarity and cooperation. While citizens 
were applauded for their acceptance of refugees during the migrant crisis, German leaders 
heavily relied on calling on citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic as merely political action 
would not be enough to stop the spread of the virus. German citizens were put at the forefront of 
crisis mitigation within the borders of Germany —discourse focused on the nation state and 
while the wider wellbeing of the EU was only secondary— in contrast to the migrant crisis in 
which German citizens' role was framed more as a necessary participant in the wider EU struggle 
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to mitigate migrant flows. Who is included in this idea of citizen complicates and problematizes 
who is included in the nation’s and the EU’s imagining of these spaces.  
Again, Germany’s role as President of the Council of the EU from July 2020- December 
2020 influenced the discourse on combating the coronavirus together as a one united Europe; 
however, when calling on citizens, Merkel directed speech at Germans.    
Empirical studies suggest that intra-EU mobility enhances the sense of EU identity and 
belonging of individuals, including non-citizens, and assists in managing the multiple layers of 
identity, which relates to intersecting social factors such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, as 
well as local, national, EU, and cosmopolitan levels (Sikoldi 2015, 823). Yet, as stated 
previously, mobility in the European Union is largely dictated by individual nation states. The 
EU has attempted to rescale state borders for a homogenous internal border. In times of crisis, 
the nation state still wields ultimate power and has securitized its border and deter entrance. The 
migrant crisis emphasized the power of bordering and exclusion while the COVID-19 crisis 
illuminated how obsolete borders can be. Border closures dictated by the state and not at the EU 
level emphasizes the power imbalance in the bordering process, as the bordering process 
becomes discriminatory based on citizenship, residency, race, and now “infection potential.”  
 The framing of Europe, European identity, and the way in which citizens have 
conceptualized mobility have been complicated if not totally overturned by recent crises. What 
seems to be in perpetual crisis in the EU has, as previously mentioned, given rise to numerous 
radical right-wing populist parties. Much like the Member States in which they manifest, these 
parties are divided amongst each other through competing nationalism based on memory politics 
and redefinitions of historical experiences but are united by strong anti-Europeanism and anti-
elitism. Far right rhetoric challenges integration by challenging international engagement in 
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favor of nationalist policies, creating a Krise des Zusammenhalts or a crisis of cohesion. Merkel 
and other political leaders were calling for cooperation and unity, although rarely calling out 
radical right-wing actors (like the AfD) in Germany. However, this call for cooperation shows 
the need to combat nationalistic rhetoric that has grown and caused diminishing international 
crises responses (Lemke 2020). While discourse by German political leaders emphasized joint 
action among Member States, mainstream parties like the CDU have failed to address systematic 
problems in crisis management, specifically in burden sharing. Distributing the burden of crisis 
among Member States has resulted in asymmetries of interdependence and bargaining power and 
mainstream parties and elites failed to address these crises by openly evaluating tradeoffs, 
presenting distinct policy alternatives, and demonstrating responsiveness to voters (Grzymala-
Busse 2019, 40). For so long Germany has not had to cope with radical right-wing populist 
movements and has been able to push for pro-integrationist policies. Now however, with the AfD 
as the third strongest party in Germany, political leaders have had to shift discourse to 
encapsulate a more domestic-centric policy platform. While this does not necessarily mean the 
downfall of integration efforts for the European Union, it does weaken it due to Germany’s 
economic and political power in driving integration policy forward.  
 My main themes of economic stability, unity and cooperation, and bordering and 
rebordering manifest throughout the three crises in different ways and exacerbate processes of 
national and supranational power. Discourse heavily emphasized economic stability which 
showed the nation-states priority and willing to compromise at the EU level for integrative 
measures. Economic stability and growth policies can be leveraged by the economically 
powerful, like Germany, and was. The stark divide that appears when discussing economic 
policy in Europe increases hostilities of the idea of a united European identity, especially when 
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citizens of Member States believe they are “bailing out” or paying for the stability of other 
nations. This discourse of some nations propping up others is precisely why the call for unity and 
cooperation has been so strong among leaders. The historical reliance Germany has had to other 
European countries for economic success is why policies have been aimed at maintaining 
stability across the union. Yet, the pro-integrationist policies that allowed Germany to become a 
dominant political and economic actor in Europe are losing favor domestically. This is in part to 
the power of bordering and who belongs. Because the nation state maintains ultimate power in 
border controls within the Schengen Area, it is hard to establish a truly open internal border 
zone, especially when there are crisis situations. Integration across state lines becomes threatened 
as national identities supersede European unity.  
There has been a mix of disintegration and integration efforts during crisis in Europe, 
exemplified by the disconnect between national and supranational agreements. However, there 
have also been varying degrees of identification with European citizenship and calls from 
politicians to cooperate at local and transnational scales, resulting in increased integration. The 
Eurozone crisis brought about more economic integration, in many parts because Germany has 
large political and economic incentives and maintains the stability of the European Economic 
Area. During the migrant crisis, domestic policy drove German leaders to push for overhauling 
the Dublin Agreement and advocating for equitable distribution of refugees, but not for changing 
the rights of Member States to enforce border controls, showing how national identity and 
domestic interests impact preferences for the scale of European integration. This scope of 
European integration preferences was seen by the lack of cooperation among Member States in 
reforming migration and border policy during the migrant crisis like they did for economic 
policy during the Eurozone crisis. Without change, mass border closures and fear of the end of 
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the Schengen Area were discussed as the novel coronavirus shut down the EU in 2020.  Member 
States closed their borders and restricted travel to preserve their nations healthcare facilities and 
protect their citizens from COVID-19, despite their being a common “European” identity and 
European right to free movement. The integration efforts of the EU are in question as growing 




















Conclusion: The Future of Europe  
 
The three crises I have analyzed have shown the dynamic ways in which European 
institutional power and European identity have shifted in the last decade and how crucial citizens 
are to the success of crisis management policies and broader integrative measures. I found that 
German political leaders stressed economic stability, European unity, and mobility in discourse. 
While crisis situations would undoubtedly put the main pillars of the European Union under 
duress (it is, after all, a political and economic union with a Single Market that abolished internal 
borders), these themes put into perspective the complicated relationships between individual 
nation states and supranational institutions. The government statements, press statements, and 
press conferences point to the disconnect between national and European policy during times of 
crisis, emphasizing the power disparity between the two. Comparing the Eurozone crisis, the 
migrant crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis and how Germany positioned itself within those showed 
me the complexities of European identity, politicization of national identity, and the process of 
burden sharing in the bloc. Germany’s political system, which disperses rather than centralizes 
power, combined with its role as stabilizing hegemon throughout several crises has resulted in an 
uneven role in pushing for an integrated Europe. German leaders have taken a dominant role in 
EU policy creation, especially during crisis, and while Germany has historically had a strong 
incentive to push for pro-integrationist economic and political policies, as it relies heavily on 
exporting to other EU countries, recent trends in anti-Europeanism among the German electorate 
have shifted domestic politics. This threatens the semi-hegemonic role Germany plays in Europe 
and the stability it gives the EU as domestic incentives for supporting future European 





 One of the greatest limitations in this study is my proficiency in political German. While 
my German is strong enough to read and understand the press conferences, government 
statements, and press statements, it is possible that I missed nuances due to the politician jargon 
used. I used dictionaries as well as asked my father to clarify any political rhetoric. Similarly, 
although I have dual citizenship and family living in Germany, I myself have lived in the United 
States for most of my life and therefore approached this study as an outsider. The political 
discourses surrounding these crises and the lingering feelings of how politicians handled them is 
something I can only glean from conversations with friends and family as well as academic 
research. Additionally, the feeling of Einheit and Einigung, connecting German success to 
European integration that has been fundamental to German foreign policy and in many ways 
German identity is something that I do not feel as a dual citizen. However, from my position I 
have the ability to critically look at how German political figures managed crises.  
Coronavirus Update 
 
Because the COVID-19 pandemic is still evolving, my data only represents a specific 
time frame. Therefore, I want to provide a brief overview of what has happened in Germany and 
the EU since my data collection, which will be helpful when discussing areas for further 
study.  Measures implemented since the last press conference I analyzed from October 28, 2020 
until March 23, 2021 are shown in Figure 4.  
My data collection ended in October 2020 before the second wave of coronavirus 
infections hit Europe. Before this, Merkel had up to 80 percent approval rating within Germany 
and the country was revered for handling the pandemic swiftly and directly. Since October, 
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Germany and the rest of the European Union has experienced a second wave, the European 
Medicine Agency has authorized three vaccines (later than the UK and the United States) and  
has implemented an EU-wide purchasing and distribution plan of the vaccines which has been 
slow and unorganized. The vaccination campaign in Germany is being carried out at the state 
level and the federal policy is that vaccines will be divided among German states according to 
their relative population sizes. Now in the midst of a third-wave, with infection rates similar to 
those in April 2020 and vaccination rates lower than those in the UK and the US, Merkel and her 
government are now under scrutiny for their crisis management. Opposition parties (the AfD, the 
Figure 4 
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Left, and the Free Democratic Party) called on Merkel to ask parliament for a vote of confidence 
over the rising discontent with her coronavirus policies (“Merkel” 2021). Merkel refused.  
Areas for Further Study 
 
While Germany’s semi-hegemonic role in Europe has been discussed by many scholars, 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Germany’s standing in Europe needs to be explored 
further. My data collection ended in October 2020 before the second wave of coronavirus 
infections hit Europe. Since October, the European Union has experienced a second wave, the 
European Medicine Agency has authorized the Pfizer BioNTech, Moderna, and AstraZeneca 
vaccines, and has implemented an EU-wide purchasing and distribution plan. The late 
authorization of vaccines caused delays in acquiring the necessary number of doses on the EU 
Commission’s timeline. Unlike the US and the UK, who were active partners with 
pharmaceutical companies, the EU just established contracts with these companies and organized 
them comparatively late. While the vaccination plan is coordinated at an EU level, national red 
tape as well as supply disruptions have caused delays, distress, and disarray with providing 
vaccines to every Member State. This begs the question of how effective EU institutions can be 
at managing the coronavirus crisis without a hegemonic force like Germany mitigating 
integrative efforts. President of the EU Commission Ursula Von der Leyen specifically voiced 
concerns over if “just a handful of big players — big member states — had rushed to it [the 
vaccine … ] everybody else would have been left empty-handed,” adding that it would have been 
“the end of our community” (Kwai 2021). Unlike in other crises, EU institutions have taken a 
leading role in coordinating policies to combat the coronavirus on a supranational level. The 
slow vaccine rollout at the EU level, Germany’s fall from successful crisis manager since the 
onset of the pandemic, and calls from Merkel’s government for a vote of confidence complicates 
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the established roll nation states have had in preventing disintegration and promoting crisis 
prevention measures. Further study in how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted national and 
supranational cooperation is necessary.   
 The future of European integration is also influenced by the United Kingdom’s new 
relationship with the EU. The UK officially left the EU on February 1, 2020 with the Withdrawal 
Agreement, which protected the rights of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU; 
avoided a hard border in Ireland; settled financial obligations; and provided for a transition 
period until December 31, 2020 (“EU-UK” 2020). As of January 1, 2021, the EU-UK Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement dictates the relationship between the UK and the EU. It involves a trade 
agreement for free, fair, sustainable trade, with zero tariffs and zero quotas; a broad economic, 
social, and environmental partnership; a new partnership for citizens’ security; and a common 
governance framework to ensure a sound and lasting partnership (“EU-UK” 2020). It is 
interesting to compare the UK’s membership within the EU (as it was not a part of the Schengen 
Area or the euro Area) and the current agreement it has. Although the UK’s position made its 
departure from the EU less difficult, it caused mass politicization between “leavers” and 
“stayers” not just nationally but across the bloc. The impact Brexit has had on national versus 
European identity as well as mobility needs to be explored further, as leaving the EU has 
complicated the incentives of the Union both through institutional and informal channels. The 
UK’s successful vaccination campaign compared to the EU’s would be an interesting case study 
of mobility and identity politics that have manifested in a post-Brexit moment.  
The coronavirus pandemic has decreased the incentives in many ways for national 
governments to pursue pro-integrationist policies, as the threat of infection has made security the 
top priority of nation states. The migrant crisis similarly found nation states making security and 
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not economic efficiency their number one priority. Prioritizing security, and effectively 
rebordering the EU, has stripped EU institutions of the regulatory control over free-movement 
during the coronavirus pandemic. Meanwhile, there has been expectations of community being 
made at the transnational level. Member States that have been more severely impacted by the 
coronavirus pandemic have increased empathy and led to more EU solidarity and leadership. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has in many ways shown the juxtapositions I have exposed in the 
framework of EU integration being reliant on Germany as a regional hegemon, yet it is possible 
that this crisis has weakened Germany’s willingness or even ability to act as that stability 
mechanism. While I have been criticizing the EU for not being able to pursue integrative policies 
and being more reliant on Member States like Germany, the EU-coordinated vaccine program 
could be showing a shift in both national and supranational willingness to cooperate and bolster 
EU institutions. The COVID-19 pandemic and healthcare/capacity crisis could be a turning point 
from which Member States realize they cannot protect their citizens from a biological threat such 
as a virus without massive coordination and cooperation and not one that can be dictated by one 
or two nation states.  
Incorporating a media analysis would further the understanding of how German leaders 
handled crises, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. A popular view of crisis management 
allows for a more intimate look at how citizens are feeling about the government as well as 
policies in place, and not just how leaders are trying to construct crisis management policies. 
Comparing how the media frames crisis situations and how political leaders frame crisis 
situations would provide further insight on the future of European integration and the overall 
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